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4ABSTRACT
This paper is drawn from an exploratory study aimed at assessing
the efficiency of the existing institution for governing labour emigration
in India with special reference to the overseas recruitment system. It
traces the evolution of the current institution from the colonial times
and foregrounds its discriminatory rationalities engendering enormous
social cost. It tracks the difference between emigration through social
network and  recruiting agents and looks at the difference of cost and
risk involved. By focusing on the unskilled and semi-skilled emigrations
from India, the paper makes an endeavour to determine the discrepancy
between the legal/policy structures and the prevailing practices of
overseas recruitment, including strategies of circumventing legality.
Drawing inputs from major stakeholders like intending emigrants, return
emigrants, emigrant households, recruiting agents, Protectors of
Emigrants,  foreign employers, emigrant labourers and Indian Missions
in select destination countries, it assesses the transaction costs of the
present institution, identifies its major inadequacies and make
recommendations for an alternative institutional framework that can
effectively counter the many and varied illegitimate and dishonest
activities which have sprung up in the field of emigration and ensure
ethical practices in India’s overseas recruitment sector.
Key words: emigration, recruitment, institution, social cost, transaction
cost, social network, legality/illegality, protection,  ECR/
ECNR
JEL Classification : J21, J23
51. Introduction
The increasing number of emigrants from India for employment
over years has resulted in intense transnational transfer of funds in favour
of the country.1 The inward flow of remittances to India had been
increasing steadily from the 1970s – from just USD 0.08 billion in 1970
to 2.79 billion by 1980, 3.42 billion by 1991, 13 billion by 2000 and 27
billion in 2007 (Irudaya Rajan, 2004; Irudaya Rajan and Prabha, 2008;
World Bank, 2008).  It has reached 52 billion in 2008 and it represents
4.2 percent of India's GDP (World Bank, Irudaya Rajan, 2010). At the
individual level, emigration turns out to be an option for economic
mobility for many and its ‘success’ has enticed many more to choose the
path. However, rising overseas labour emigration coupled with a
relentless urge among others to follow the same has produced a robust
overseas recruitment industry  in the county and has also complicated
and despoiled the system in general, offering a formidable challenge to
the government and its regulatory organs. In fact, the Government of
India itself has admitted that the system put in place to regulate and
streamline the emigration process has failed to generate the desired
results. On the other hand, the nexus formed between the erring
government officials in this administrative apparatus and the
unscrupulous recruiting agents has accentuated corruption resulting in
1 India is highest recipient of remittances in the world today. With about 10
million Indians working in various parts of the globe, the country obtained
US$ 27 billion as remittances  in 2007. China, Mexico and Philippines
follow India in the list of the highest remittance receiving-countries with
US$ 25.7 billion, US$ 25 billion and US$ 17 billion respectively. However,
Mexico (11.5 million) and Russia (11.5 million) have a greater number of
their citizens working outside as migrants than India (World Bank, 2008).
6increasing exploitation of the poor.2 In such an alarming context, the
present study endeavours to understand the structures and dynamics of
the overseas recruitment system in India, bring out its inadequacies and
propose measures for their rectification.
1.1 The Problem
The study presumes that the chances for exploitation and deceit
are significantly lower in the case of recruitment of skilled labourers
and professionals. Higher levels of educational attainment, professional/
technical competence, better awareness and lesser competition due to
inelastic supply and high demand ensure them a relatively trouble-free
emigration and expatriate life, compared to their unskilled and semi-
skilled counterparts. In the case of the latter, the compulsion to eke out
a living and attain some vertical economic mobility through spatial
relocation is much more intense. However, at a broader level, this study
is concerned with the efficiency of the institution dealing with emigration
governance in India. According to the perspective of New Institutional
Economics (NIE), an institution is defined as a set of rules, both formal
and informal, that governs the game. An institution like the  one for
governing emigration, is usually devised through governmental
intervention as the dynamics of the market alone might not be sufficient
to achieve socially desirable outcomes or the market dynamics could
adversely influence such outcomes. Over a period of time, an institution
devised under specific circumstances may lose its currency and
relevance.  The changing socio-economic milieu or the unrealistically
high social cost involved in maintaining the institution may have caused
this change. Whenever newer institutions are formulated, replacing the
earlier ones, fresh challenges may crop up. All such governmental
interventions formulating new institutions would involve varying
2 Statement by the Minister for Overseas Indian Affairs in the Parliament and
to the media, Sept, 2007.
7magnitude of social costs. Hence it is very important to devise an
institution that requires minimum social cost, whenever an existing
institution is revamped because it entails enormous social costs. The
functioning of any institution invariably involves transaction costs too,
by which its efficiency may be assessed.3 The most effective institution
will be the one that incurs minimum transaction cost as people will find
it obligatory to follow the rules of the institution in their own best
interest. An institution that functions without such voluntary public
compliance would require greater enforcement. The transaction costs of
the institution will also be higher if the people can or have incentive to
manipulate the administrative apparatus and escape the enforcement
mechanism or circumvent it altogether.
The present exercise is intended to assess the efficiency/deficiency
of the existing institution for governing labour emigration, with special
reference to the overseas recruitment system. Overseas recruitment
activities in India are interlinked with diverse factors and spheres. They
include the structures for regulating emigration that are not related to
the recruitment system per se. Other factors such as market dynamics,
social auditing or lack of it, pressure for emigration and varied
characteristics at the destination countries also affect recruitment
activities. This inquiry does not go into the intricacies of this
interrelationship in great detail and depth. The attempt is confined to
identifying some of the major problems associated with the existing
institution of emigration governance pertaining to the overseas
recruitment practices that makes its social and transaction costs
unaffordable. The study starts with an analysis of the evolution of the
institution of overseas recruitment from colonial times and the
rationalities underlying it, followed by a detailed description of the
diverse problems encountered in the field as revealed and perceived by
3 The costs of resources utilised for the creation, maintenance, use, and change
of institutions and organisations are included in the transaction cost.
8different stakeholders. The multiple ways in which the institution is
manipulated will be brought into discussion in terms of the manifold
transaction and social costs involved. From there, it proceeds to outline
a few alternative forms of governmental intervention to envision a new
institution that would significantly minimise social and transaction
costs alike.
1.2 The Objectives
The specific objectives of the study are the following:
• To study the existing institution for governing labour emigration
from India with its discriminatory and protective rationalities
and to assess its efficiency with special reference to the overseas
recruitment practices.
• To investigate the emigration process through different channels
like recruiting agents (RAs hereafter) and social network and to
identify the differences, cost and risk.
• To determine the magnitude of discrepancy between legal/policy
structures and prevailing practices of overseas recruitment, with
special reference to the segments of unskilled, low-skilled and
semi-skilled expatriate workers, alongside the strategies adopted
by the parties involved to circumvent the legal structures and
regulatory mechanism.
• To identify the areas in which the social and transaction costs of
the present institution are prohibitively high and make
recommendations for an alternative set up  in the best interests of
the emigrant workers.
1.3 Data and Methodology
The study has drawn inputs from various stakeholders. They
include intending emigrants, emigrant households, return emigrants,
registered recruiting agents and Protector of Emigrants (POEs).
9Consultations, in a limited scale, with foreign employers, recruiting
companies and labourers in a few destination countries in the Gulf region
were also held. All the stakeholders, except employers, recruiting
agencies and labourers at the destination countries have been
interviewed with the help of structured schedules. While intending
emigrants, recruiting agents and POEs were surveyed in the eight cities
where the POE offices are located,4 the coverage of emigrant households
and return emigrants in this study is restricted to the state of Kerala.
Table-1 gives the sample size of the surveys with location-wise
distribution.
The intending emigrants were interviewed at the POE offices when
they came there for getting emigration clearance (Table-2). Out of the
two categories of emigration clearance seekers, namely, those who seek
it directly and those who do it through registered RAs, only the former
are covered in the survey as the latter are not required to personally
appear at the POE office. Most of the intending emigrants who seek
emigration clearance directly are found to be emigrating through
informal networks of friendship or kinship, and not through RAs.
However, it is found  that there are a good number of intending emigrants,
though not substantial, who submit their application directly, to the
POE even when an RA – whether registered or unregistered – is behind
their recruitment. RAs are not allowed to recruit housemaids.  So the
housemaids approach the POE directly for emigration clearance even
when they are illicitly recruited by RAs.
4 Chandigarh, Chennai, Cochin, Hyderabad, Kolkata, Mumbai, New Delhi
and Thiruvananthapuram are the eight cities with POE offices. These eight
key locations are also the major hubs of overseas recruitment activity in the
country.
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Table 2: Number of Intending Migrants surveyed in 8 POE
Locations in India by Sex, 2007
Place Male Female Total Male Female Total
Chandigarh 11 1 12 2.5 0.5 1.8
Chennai 32 11 43 7.2 5.3 6.6
Delhi 60 0 60 13.5 0.0 9.2
Ernakulam 57 46 103 12.8 22.0 15.8
Hyderabad 20 115 135 4.5 55.0 20.6
Kolkatta 99 1 100 22.3 0.5 15.3
Mumbai 93 1 94 20.9 0.5 14.4
Thiruvananthapuram 73 34 107 16.4 16.3 16.4
Total 445 209 654 100.0 100.0 100.0
An extensive survey of expatriate Indian workers located in
different countries was not feasible on account of the non-availability
of time and resources.   So a survey of emigrant households was
conducted selectively in three districts of Kerala. Though it cannot be a
substitute for a full survey of Indian workers currently abroad, yet  was
useful as it brought in a wealth of information on the processes and
problems of overseas labour recruitment. The three districts surveyed
are Alappuzha, Palakkad and Kannur. Nearly half the sample is from
Kannur, the district with the second largest share of emigrant households
in the state (Zachariah and Irudaya Rajan, 2007). Table-3 shows the sex-
wise distribution of emigrants in the sample households, selected from
the ‘Migration Monitoring Survey, 2007’ conducted by the Centre for
Development Studies for the Department of Non-Resident Keralite
Affairs, Government of Kerala. Close relatives of the emigrants living in
the  household were interviewed to collect information on various aspects
of the emigration with special reference to the overseas recruitment
process.
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Table 3: Distribution of Sample Emigrant Households by Districts,
2007
Districts Number of Number Percent
 Households Male Female Total Male Female Total
Alappuzha 115 114 22 136 24.5 34.4 25.7
Palakkad 87 117 17 134 25.2 26.6 25.3
Kannur 187 234 25 259 50.3 39.1 49.0
Total 389 465 64 529 100.0 100.0 100.0
The survey of the ‘return emigrants’ draws its samples from five
districts of Kerala, the state that has the lion’s share of return emigrants
in India. The sample for this household survey is also taken from the
same ‘Migration Monitoring Survey, 2007’ (See Table-4 for sex-wise
and district-wise distribution of the sample). The survey is carried out
on the presumption that return emigrants, being a category of workers
who had been exposed to diverse realities of emigration both in the
source and the destination countries, would be able to give highly useful
information on the functioning of the overseas recruitment system in
India. Among the five districts covered by the survey, Malappuram,
Trichur and Kollam have high proportion of return emigrants in the
state, and Kozhikode and Pathanamthitta have relatively fewer numbers.5
It is also important to note that most of the return emigrants reporting
under the present survey emigrated after 1981: 20.6 per cent during
1981-90, 40.7 per cent during 1991-2000 and 24.2 per cent during
2001-2007. Only 3 per cent had emigrated prior to 1970 and another
11.5 per cent between 1971 and 1980.
5 The share of Malappuram in the total number of return emigrants in Kerala
is 16.2 per cent, 11.8 per cent in the case of Trichur, 9.6 per cent in the case
of Kollam, 6.4 per cent in the case of Kozhikode and 2.9 per cent in the case
of Pathanamthitta. Thiruvananthapuram has the highest share (18.1 per
cent) and Iddukki and Wayanad districts the lowest (1 per cent each).
Zachariah and Irudaya Rajan, 2007.
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Table 4: Survey of Return Emigrants by Sex and districts, 2007
 Districts Number Percent
Male Female Total Male Female Total
Kollam 61 6 67 17.2 18.8 17.3
Kozhikode 44 6 50 12.4 18.8 12.9
Malappuram 151 3 154 42.5 9.4 39.8
Pathanamthitta 31 2 33 8.7 6.3 8.5
Trichur 68 15 83 19.2 46.9 21.5
Total 355 32 387 100.0 100.0 100.0
The survey of registered RAs was conducted in eight POE cities
and one non-POE city, a total of nine cities. The RAs, who are important
players in the system, were interviewed with the intention of
comprehending the intricacies of the recruitment process in India as
practiced and subjected to by the authorised agents. The survey was
designed to identify the difficulties faced by genuine agents and the
ambiguities and loopholes that abound in the process. The sites of the
survey were decided under a presumption that most of the registered
RAs are located in the cities in which POE offices function. Those cities
are also the major gateways of international migration from India. The
study covered all the three types of authorised RAs who were falling
within the statutory categorisation based on the volume of recruitment
permitted, namely: (a) ‘up to 300’ workers, (b) ‘301-1000’ workers and
(c) ‘above 1000’ workers.  Of the RAs covered under the present study,
41.6 per cent were from South India (Chennai, Cochin, Kozhikode,
Hyderabad and Thiruvananthapuram) while the remaining 58.4 per cent
were from regions other than South India (Chandigarh, Delhi, Kolkata
and Mumbai).  As a whole, 267 RAs came under the present survey –
108 from Mumbai, 26 each from Chandigarh and Hyderabad, 7 from
Chennai, 19 from Delhi, 3 from Kolkatta, 42 from Kochi and 24 from
Thiruvananthapuram. Twelve RAs in Kozhikode, a city with robust
14
recruitment activity but without a POE office, were also surveyed (Table-
5).6
All the eight Protectors of Emigrants were also consulted.  They
were supplied with a structured schedule to elicit their perception about
the overseas recruitment sector in general and the existing administrative
mechanism in particular. The structured schedules had been supplemented
by personal interactions with each of them. The foreign employers in the
labour-receiving countries of Qatar, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates
and the foreign recruiting agents in Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates
had also been very selectively consulted. First-hand information about
the recruitment channels, the fraudulence involved and the sufferings
that the emigrants underwent in the destination countries was obtained
through visits to a few migrant labour camps in Qatar and Bahrain; a few
interviews were also conducted with the Indian Missions in these countries.
Newspaper reports from India as well as from the Gulf region were also
used selectively. Collection of data for the study was conducted during
the period between September and December 2007. However, major
limitations of this endeavour are that neither a full-fledged ethnographical
investigation nor extensive usage of case studies was made.
2.  Making of the Institution
The Indian Emigration Act of 1983 and the Indian Passport Act of
1967 form the legal bedrocks on which the existing Indian institution for
governing emigrations rests.  Governmental intervention on emigrations
from India during the postcolonial phase seemed to be half hearted and the
institutional framework that came into being with the Emigration Act of
1983 had not been bolstered subsequently by coherent administrative and
policy structures.  However, the underlying rationalities intrinsic to the
present institution have a slightly longer historical evolution.
6 The sample constitutes nearly 15 per cent of the authorised RAs ‘functioning’
in the country. The website of the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs listed
1,820 RAs as on 2005.
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2.1  The Colonial Technology
Colonialism, apart from integrating India into the larger imperial
world, had produced conditions that spawned an unprecedented scale
and variety of emigrations from the country. However, the passport regime
and the emigration regulations of the colonial days were guided by
multiple structures of discrimination in which race, education, loyalty,
social and economic position and labour skills played defining roles of
citizenship and space for mobility.7 Introduced into India during the
19th century, the passport institutionalised a race discriminatory
immigration regime and became an instrument of restricting the
emigration of Indians to colonies and dominions of the Empire earmarked
for white settler nationhood, like Australia and Canada for instance
(Lake and Reynolds, 2008; Singha, 2006; Mongia, 1999; Mongia,
2007).8 As a result, the British Indian passport, which offered protection
by the British Crown to its holder,  became a privilege open only to a
few; an official attestation of civility, a document meant for men of
means or of “education and respectability” who “could potentially be
accepted as settlers anywhere in the empire” (Singha, 2006). The colonial
administration also used the document as an instrument of political
control and as a mechanism to enforce loyalty during the heydays of
Indian nationalism (Metcalf, 2005; Singha, 2006). This naturally became
a point of dispute between the colonial administration and the Indian
intelligentsia, which was otherwise happy with the pleasing distinction
drawn between the ‘wretched’ coolie and the respectable passport holder
(Singha, 2006).
7 The invention of the passport as a measure to discipline the citizen had its
genesis in the modern political evolution of mutually excluding nation
states and citizenship. As a bureaucratic expression of nationality, it became
yet another instrument in the expansion of state authority (Lloyd, 2003;
Torpey, 2000).
8 The racial facet of immigration policy of the Empire is apparent in the
‘colour-bar’ imposed by the colonies for white settlements on Indian
Emigrants (Huttenback, 1973; Mongia, 1999).
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The coolie labourers, who were emigrating as indentured labourers
to colonial plantations, were technically not required to possess passports
to emigrate. On the contrary, the rule practically denied them passports
and thereby the colonial promise of protection by the British Crown.
The vitality of this form of emigration, which was certainly the dominant
stream in terms of number, was such that within the existing legal
vocabulary of the time, terms like ‘emigrate’, ‘emigration’ and ‘emigrant’
were referred to indicate only indentured labour (Mongia, 2007). It is
estimated that more than 1.3 million Indians left their homeland as
indentured labourers between 1830 and 1920 (Metcalf, 2007). The
‘coolie agreement’ was a mandatory requirement for such emigrations.
In reality it did not ensure any protection to the concerned labourers
due to the vagueness of local laws in the destinations.  The
documentation served the disciplining purpose of binding the coolie to
a five-year engagement with a particular plantation owner, and more
importantly, to stagnant wages (Singha, 2006).  However, the Government
of India laid down various regulations, which included the regulations
of 1837, 1843, 1864, 1882, 1908 and 1916, with a self-assumed intention
of ‘protecting’ the indentured worker at the respective destinations in
the wake of outcries that indenture was yet another form of slavery
(Tinker, 1974). As a result of these regulations, indentured embarkations
were permitted only from the ports of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay
and each colony recruiting indentured labour was made to appoint an
emigration agent in the ports of embarkation (Lal, 2006). The regulations
also brought in a licensed regime of recruitment, according to which
only those authorised agents working under the main emigration agent
were given the right to recruit.9  The office of the “Protector of Emigrants”
9 The Protector of Emigrants licensed such agents who were working in the
field on the recommendation of the emigration agent and this license had to
be countersigned by the magistrate of the district where the recruiting agent
intended to work. Despite this regulatory institutional framework, apart
from the licensed recruiters, there were unlicensed recruiters or  arkatis
active in recruiting indentured labour from colonial India (Lal, 2006).
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which came into existence in the 1860s, was made responsible for the
overall supervision of the overseas recruitment in India.  It had to make
sure that labourers emigrated with proper coolie agreements, that the
emigrants were proceeding on their own free will and that they
understood the conditions of the contract (Anstey and Anstey, 1977).
Most of the recruitment for indentured labour had been done from the
regions of North India, whereas the recruitment from the South was done
mostly under the kangani and maistry systems.10 It is pointed out that
kangani system prevailed in the case of Malaya and Ceylon, whereas
maistry system was in place for recruiting labour to Burma (Lal, 2006;
Bhaskar, 2000), colonies known for ‘free labour migration’ (Ramasamy,
1992; Guilmoto, 1993; Lal, 2006; Peebles, 2001; Jain, 1998). This was
justified on the ground that these destinations were close to India. (Carter,
1995). At the same time, labourers, small peasants and retailers were
discouraged from setting out for British Columbia, California, Australia
or Argentina. As a result, men of humbler backgrounds found it extremely
difficult to get official documentation for moving out to work in spaces
other than tropical plantations (Singha, 2006).
The Passport Rules of 1917, the Passport Act of 1920 along with
the Emigration Act of 1922 had almost put a stop to indentured labour
emigration. This was also a result of an elite campaign in India for its
abolition. The nationalist campaign was due to the broken promise of
‘imperial citizenship’ and was considered as an attempt to retrieve India’s
“national prestige” which was seen lost due to ‘coolieism’. Abolition of
indenture was articulated as necessary for stimulating national industrial
development (Shirras 1931; Singha 2006; Metcalf, 2007).11 The Act of
10 Like the kangani system, the maistry system of labour recruitment too
relied on a system of advances as an inducement for emigration and every
plantation worker started his work in the overseas plantations with a debt
account (Lal, 2006).
11 The nationalist discourse, informed considerably by an ambivalent colonial
discourse, had seen the indenture system as something that enslaved men,
made women prostitutes and destroyed family - a system that brought
national shame for Indians (Mohapatra, 1995).
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1922 stipulated procedures for emigration and steps to be taken by
foreign agents in India for the welfare of such emigrant workers. The Act
made government notifications for recruitment and emigration
mandatory. The Great Depression that followed also held back demand
for labour in the colonial plantations across the world and in fact resulted
in large-scale repatriation of Indian labourers (Metcalf, 2007; Lal, 2006).
However, it should be remembered that the colonial government was
successful in sustaining the trans-colonial flows of indentured labour
from India almost for a century through strategies like the modality of
inquiry, underwritten by a liberal notion of impartiality (Mongia, 2003).
2.2 Postcolonial Institution of Emigration Governance
The Passport Act of 1967 tightened the passport regime of
postcolonial India and invalidated emigration of persons at their
individual (‘at one’s own risk’) discretion.12 In contrast, the government
of independent India remained almost indifferent to emigration
governance for a long time. Nonetheless, an office called ‘Controller
General of Emigrants’ was established in the Ministry of External Affairs
which was supposed to work broadly on the principles laid down by the
colonial Emigration Act. However, new emigration flows from India of
people with technical and professional qualifications to the
industrialised West from the 1950s onwards and of predominantly
unskilled and semi-skilled emigration to the Middle East from the 1970s,
made apparent the inadequacies of the Emigration Act of 1922. The
Gulf boom also resulted in the emergence of large number of recruiting
agents who resorted to exploitative practices, including extortions and
betrayals. The unskilled and semi-skilled labourers were particularly at
their mercy. It was in such a context of ‘market failure’ that the Emigration
Act of 1983 was enacted with the same protectionist logic of the colonial
institutional framework, though the immediate provocation was a
12 Passport Act of 1967, (Act No. 15 of 1967 dated 24th. June, 1967), Section 3.
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Supreme Court directive as part of a judgement (Kangra and Others Vs
Union of India, dated. 20.03.1979). The increasing volume of inward
remittances and its importance in the national economy was arguably
another reason for government intervention. As a result of the 1983 Act,
the office of the Controller General of Emigrants in the Ministry of
External Affairs was re-designated, with new responsibilities and powers,
as the Protector General of Emigrants (PGE). The new office was attached
to the Ministry of Labour till it was transferred to the Ministry of Overseas
Indian Affairs  in 2004,13 and since then, the protection and welfare of
emigrants, along with the regulation of the recruitment practices in the
country became the responsibility of the PGE.
The Act introduced a licensed recruitment regime.  It brought a
new system of ‘emigration clearance’ according to which “[n]o citizen
of India” was permitted to emigrate without the authorisation of the
Protector of Emigrants (POE).14 Subsequently however, subscribing to
the logic of ‘protection by exception’, emigration clearance had been
made mandatory only for Emigration Check Required (ECR) passport
holders, leaving Emigration Check Not Required (ECNR) passport
holders out of the regulative framework. The ECNR status was conferred
by virtue of the higher educational status of the passport holder, and
initially, persons who were Graduates and above were exempted from
ECR; this was subsequently reduced, first to the Intermediate (Higher
Secondary) level and recently to the Matriculation (Secondary School)
level. The ‘protection by exception’ expression here assumes that less
educated emigrants, mainly working in the unskilled and semi-skilled
sectors, need additional protection as they are more vulnerable for
13 The formation of the ‘Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs’ (MOIA) in
September 2004 could be seen as a testimony of Government of India’s
growing interest in the affairs of overseas Indians. See for details, Irudaya
Rajan, Varghese and Jayakumar (2009), pp. 19-20.
14 The PGE administers the Emigration Act of 1983 through eight field offices
called Protectors of Emigrants (POE) located in the eight cities mentioned
earlier.
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exploitation than other categories of emigrants belonging to skilled
and professional sectors. Moreover, emigration clearance is required
only in the case of emigration to those countries listed by the
Government of India as countries requiring such clearance.15 Seventeen
countries are listed as emigration check required countries along with
Iraq, to where emigration is banned.  They constitute the major labour
receiving countries from India. As a measure of governmentality the
worker is deemed eligible for protection once s/he gets the emigration
clearance. The ECR passport holders can submit their application for
emigration clearance directly as ‘individuals’ or through registered RAs
to the POE.16  An ECR passport holder was required to get a ‘suspension’
of the ECR (ECRS) requirement even when s/he intended to travel to
the listed countries for non-employment purposes. This requirement
had been repealed since October 1, 2007.
The Act authorizes the PGE to issue Registration certificates to
the RAs after careful scrutiny of their applications for license. The
registration is given to RAs in three categories, classified according to
the number of persons they can recruit during the period for which
registration is applied for: (a) 300 or less workers, (b) 301 to 1000, and
(c) 1000 and above. Security deposits of Rs. 3 lakh, Rs. 5 lakh and Rs.
10 lakh respectively are collected from these three categories of RAs. In
an effort to prevent exorbitant collection of charges by RAs, the
Government of India has fixed upper limits for service charges – it
should not exceed Rs. 2000 in the case of unskilled workers, Rs. 3000
for semi-skilled workers, Rs. 5000 for skilled workers and Rs.10,000 for
persons of other categories. The RAs are required to give ‘receipts’ to
15 As of now, seventeen countries come under this category- the UAE, KSA,
Qatar, Oman, Kuwait and Bahrain, Malaysia, Libya, Jordan, Yemen, Sudan,
Brunei, Afghanistan, Indonesia, Syria, Lebanon and Thailand. The
Government of India views these countries as countries where immigrant
labourers are exposed to exploitation of various kinds.  Emigration to Iraq
is now completely banned apparently for security reasons.
16 See, Irudaya Rajan, Varghese and Jayakumar (2009) for details.
22
the emigrants for such payments.17 The registered RAs can submit the
applications for emigration clearance on behalf of their recruitees.18
The registering authority is empowered to suspend or cancel the
registration certificates of RAs if the latter violate the terms and
conditions of the  certificate; and also can initiate criminal proceedings
against them.19 In addition, the Act provides space for direct recruitment
by the foreign employers after obtaining necessary permission from the
respective Indian Mission or from the PGE to do so. In case of exploitation
of Indian workers, upon recommendation from the respective Indian
Missions, the PGE may also place a foreign employer or Company under
the ‘Prior Approval Category’ (PAC).
The current regulative mechanism, in a certain sense, retains the
logic of governmentality as in the colonial regime. The latter was based
on a notion of citizenship with preferential treatment through its passport
regime. If the ‘slave-like treatment’ received by the indentured Indian
migrants had given the reason for governmental intervention during
colonial times, it was the widespread cheating and exploitation of the
low-skilled emigrants by RAs and employers that induced the
postcolonial government to ‘undertake’ the responsibility of protecting
these vulnerable categories.  The creation or innovation of ECR/ECNR
categories divided the citizenry and brought the former category under
a protective regime while allowing the latter to emigrate freely. If the
colonial system denied passport and thereby a promise of protection by
the British Crown to the disprivileged categories of Indian people, the
postcolonial institution of emigration governance has brought the
17 Emigration Rules, 1983, Section. 25.
18 See, Irudaya Rajan, Varghese and Jayakumar (2009) for details on specific
requirements of this.
19 See for the terms and conditions of the Registration Certificate, Emigration
Rules, 1983, Section. 10; and for the grounds on which registration may be
suspended or cancelled, Emigration Act of 1983, Chapter III, Section. 14.
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educationally disprivileged sections of emigrants under the regulatory
regime, as we would see, with an empty promise of protection.
Such a regulative mechanism has proved to be restrictive in practice,
disallowing an equal opportunity framework. This is particularly true
when it comes to the case of low-skilled women emigrants who could be
described as outliers within outliers. Several disabling regulations are
imposed upon them, one after another, in the name of ‘protection’.
Regulations of this kind most often receive tacit acquiescence of the
public as they go in conformity with the prevailing patriarchal norms. An
important intervention in this direction has occurred in 1999, when the
Government of India banned deployment of Indian workers for employment
as housemaids or male domestics in Kuwait. The latter category was
excluded from the ban a little later. This was followed by the imposition
of a minimum age of 30 years for Indian citizens to emigrate as housemaids
in the Gulf countries, which was subsequently extended to all ECR
countries and all ECR passports irrespective of the nature/category of
employment. Another regulation that made a direct employment contract
between the worker and the employer mandatory in effect had banned
recruitment of ECR categories of women by the RAs.20 Such disabling
regulations give an impression that they are devised to prevent the women
from emigrating, instead of safeguarding them. These stringent
governmental measures work in tandem with the dominant social norm
which holds that such women emigrants are ‘low in character and capital’.
This results in the denigration of recruitment to such categories of work
and forces the intending low-skilled women emigrants to rely on illegal
channels for recruitment.
2.3 Overseas Recruitment Process: A Snapshot
The recruitment for overseas employment from India is a highly
complicated process. It takes place through a trans-national network
20 See, Irudaya Rajan, Varghese and Jayakumar (2009) for details.
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involving multiple players. An authorised recruitment process usually
starts when an overseas employer issues a Demand Letter and Power of
Attorney to an RA to recruit labourers from the sending country.21 The
employer is supposed to do this directly, though these days they
increasingly depend on local recruiting agents or clearing agents or
contracting companies for recruiting manpower. Both these documents
are expected to have been attested by the concerned Indian Embassies/
Missions. On request and production of these documents, the POE grants
the concerned RA permission to carry out recruitment.22 If the demand
is very high, the POE is supposed to send the application to the PGE for
permission. After the recruitment, the RA can send the ECNR recruitees
to the respective destination, but has to get ‘emigration clearance’ in the
case of ECR recruitees on production of all the required documents. The
employers are supposed to bear all the costs of emigration, including
travel, visa, medical tests, service charges, cost of advertisement and
other expenses. The emigrant workers in various overseas locations also
manage to obtain/purchase visas from employers/sponsors/agents for
their relatives and friends back home. It is also well known that many
unauthorised RAs and individual agents manage to get visas from the
foreign employers or their agents or recruiting/contracting companies.
A foreign employer can recruit workers directly too provided s/he obtains
permission for the same from the PGE. The input from the concerned
Indian Mission plays a decisive role in granting them permission.
Though direct recruitment is considered safe, the volume of emigration
taking place through this channel is minimal and only big enterprises/
employers hiring for high-end jobs, would adopt this channel.
21 Demand Letter specifies the details of labour in demand and Power of
Attorney authorises the RA to recruit a labourer on behalf of the concerned
employer.
2 2 See Sections 16-21 of the Emigration Act and Sections 11-14 of Emigration
Rules of 1983 for more details on requirements for obtaining permission to
recruit.
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Recruitment through registered/authorised RAs represents the
single most important formal channel in overseas recruitment. The
registered RAs come from both private and public sectors, though the
role of the latter remains insignificant. Most of the states do not have
RAs in the public sector. However, a few states like Kerala, Tamil Nadu
and Andhra Pradesh have state-run RAs. Kerala has two state-run RAs,
viz., the Overseas Development and Employment Promotion Consultants
Ltd. (ODEPC) and the Non Resident Keralites Affairs Department
(NORKA). The public sector RAs are less insistent and vigorous in their
functioning, as borne out by the minimal number of recruitments done
by them – for instance, ODEPC could send only 4,800 people abroad
till 2006, in its three-decade long functioning.23 The private agents
perform the lion’s share in the quantum of overseas recruitment through
RAs. Among the licensed RAs, the majority are small establishments
with minimum investment. They either get job orders or purchase them
from overseas employers/agents; they also get recruitment work
outsourced by bigger RAs, particularly from those located in Mumbai
and Delhi.  A good number of RAs conduct their business fairly and
ethically.  However, it is believed that the private RAs in general are
prone to corruption and illegalities. A large number of unauthorised
agents in the field, constituting both firms and individuals, often function
as middlemen between the foreign employers/agents or local RAs and
the prospective emigrants. Most often the chain would be extremely
lengthy, involving friends/relatives/neighbours, a strategy adopted by
the unauthorised players to reach out to their potential clients and
generate confidence in their bona fides. Being out of the regulative
23 ODEPC was started in 1977 as a public sector company and had been the
only public sector manpower-exporting firm in the State till 2008, when
NORKA too started  manpower exporting services. The cases of Overseas
Manpower Corporation Ltd. (OMC) in Tamil Nadu and Overseas Manpower
Company Andhra Pradesh Ltd (OMCAP) in Andhra Pradesh are not different
either. Most of them offer registration facility for prospective emigrants for
which a fee ranging from Rs.70 to Rs.750 is charged, apart from collecting
money for every other services provided.
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framework, they indulge in rank corruption and illegalities, increasing
the risk factor in the field as a whole.
3.  Compulsive Situations and Sky-High Costs
3.1 Social Capital, Pressing Compulsions, Meagre Awareness
The surveys conducted among the intending emigrants, return
emigrants and emigrant households clearly brings out that for the
majority social capital, in the form of social networks through relatives
and friends, is the primary resource and channel that facilitates
emigration. Almost 80 per cent of the intending emigrants surveyed for
the present study were planning to emigrate through the channel of
social network, while another 7 per cent were seeking direct recruitment
through the foreign employers (Table 6). However, even among those
seeking emigration clearances directly from the POE as individuals,
13.5 per cent were actually recruited by the RAs.24 Among the intending
emigrants who reported that they were emigrating through recruiting
agents, only 34.2 per cent relied upon registered RAs; 46.8 per cent
depended on unregistered RAs, and 19 per cent did not know whether
the RAs were registered or not.  Only 75 per cent of the RAs, whether
registered or unregistered, have established offices and the remaining
25 per cent could be better labelled as field agents. Among the
unregistered, 51.4 per cent were stated to be individual agents and the
remaining 48.6 per cent were firms. The emigrant household survey in
Kerala too reveals that majority of the emigrants (73.2 per cent) depended
on social network for their emigration, while 21 per cent arranged it
through private RAs (Table 7). Compared to the men, the women are
more inclined to choose the channel of social network. Regarding
24 This rather strange situation could be due to  multiple reasons – the RA
concerned could be unauthorised; the RA might not have the documents
necessary for conducting recruitment; the number of recruitments could be
very low and hence the RA could find it more viable to send them as
‘individuals ’ to the POE; the recruitment could have been for categories
such as housemaids for which RA involvement is virtually disallowed.
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awareness about the legal status of the RAs, only 42.1 per cent of the
emigrant households were sure that the RAs who arranged emigration
were registered/licensed ones; while 46.7 per cent were not sure of this
and 11.2 per cent were certain that they had no legal standing at all. The
survey of return emigrants too reports similar results. When (in the last
episode of emigration) a fourth of them emigrated through private agents,
70 per cent used their social capital for making it possible (Table 8).  Out
of the return emigrants who had emigrated through ‘private agencies’,
only 8 per cent had done it through registered RAs, 12.9 emigrated
through illegal individual agents and the remaining 4.1 per cent through
unauthorised travel agencies, making a total of 25 per cent.
Table 6: Channels of Present Emigration (Intending Migrants), 2007
Channel Male Female Total Male Female Total
Friends and relatives 330 185 515 74.2 88.52 78.7
Government agency 3 0 3 0.7 0.00 0.5
Foreign employer 41 7 48 9.2 3.35 7.3
Private RAS          71 17 88 16.01 8.1 13.5
Total 445 209 654 100.0 100.0 100.0
Table 7: Channel of Emigration as reported by Emigrant
households, 2007
 Channels Number Percent
Male Female  Total Male Female Total
Friends and relatives 323 54 377  71.15   88.52  73.20
Private RAS 103   4 107  22.69     6.56  20.78
Foreign employer   28   3   31    6.17     4.92    6.02
Total 454 61 515 100.00 100.00 100.00
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Table 8: Channel of the last emigration by Return Emigrants, 2007
Emigration channel Number Percentage
Male Female Total Male Female Total
  RAS 28 3 31 7.9 9.4 8.0
Individual agents 49 1 50 13.8 3.1 12.9
Travel agencies 15 1 16 4.2 3.1 4.1
Private Agencies 92 5 97 25.9 15.6 25.0
Friends 63 4 67 17.7 12.5 17.3
Relatives 183 22 205 51.5 68.8 53.0
Direct 17 1 18 4.9 3.1 4.7
Total 355 32 387 100.0 100.0 100.0
It seems that pressing circumstances at home along with dreams
of upward mobility prompt more and more people to venture into
emigration. As the statistics available from the POE offices indicate, the
unskilled and semi-skilled emigrations from India are consistently on
the rise.25 Interestingly, only 8 per cent of the intending emigrants have
cited unemployment as the primary rationale behind their decision to
emigrate.   As Table 9 exhibits, as much as 63 per cent of the intending
emigrants cite inadequate earnings at home as the reason to emigrate.
Sixteen per cent of the intending emigrants cite the problem of
underemployment and the consequent lack of adequate resources for a
livelihood as the reason to emigrate. Proportionately more women than
men report this reason.  Only about 6 per cent of the intending emigrants
see emigration as a means to acquire a better job. Among women
intending emigrants, the proportion of the same is just below 2 per cent.
Among the return emigrants surveyed, 81.3 per cent were employed
prior to their emigration, while 16 per cent of them were unemployed at
25 The total number of persons who were granted emigration clearance /
ECNR endorsement in the year 2003 was 4,66,456. It  increased to 4,74,960
in 2004, to 5,48,853 in 2005, to 6,76,912 in 2006, to 8,09,453 in 2007 and
to 8,48,601 in 2008 (MOIA, 2008 & 2009).
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home.26 Noticeably, 7.31 per cent of the intending emigrants were seen
to be emigrating for a job ‘lower’ than what they already possessed in
the home country. This would certainly be on an expectation of getting
better returns than what they were earning in the home country even
though they would be employed in a ‘lower’ job.27 It is inadequate
earnings at home that apparently caused the majority to emigrate. Almost
50 per cent of the intending emigrants surveyed earned less than Rs.
3000 a month and another 30 per cent between Rs.3001 and Rs. 5000.
Taken together, 80 per cent of them earned a monthly remuneration of
less than Rs. 5000 at home. The situation is not much different when the
total family income of the intending emigrants is taken into
consideration.28 In a majority of the cases the salaries offered would
generate considerable increase of income after emigration–43 per cent
of them were offered a salary between Rs. 5,001 and 10,000; 26.4 per
cent between Rs. 10,001 and 15,000; 11.3 per cent Rs. 15,001 or more;
however, 19.3 per cent of them would earn only Rs. 5,000 or below in
the countries of destination. The intending women emigrants, in
comparison to their male counterparts, were offered much lower salaries
– 56.1 per cent were offered Rs.5,000 or below and 38.6 per cent between
Rs. 5,001 and 10,000.  However, on the whole, their overseas jobs were
expected to create a surge of income for both male and female intending
migrants. If the average income they earned at home was Rs. 3,916 per
month (Rs. 5,144 for men and Rs. 2,687 for women), the expected/
offered income overseas was Rs. 10799 (Rs.12884 for men and Rs. 6362
in the case of women) per month. The monthly earning was expected to
26 Most of the return emigrants under the present survey emigrated during the
period since 1981. Only 3 per cent had emigrated prior to 1970.
27 52.82 per cent of them were offered the ‘same job’ in the destination, while
31.73 per cent got a ‘similar job’ and only 8.14 per cent got the offer of a
‘higher job’.
28 See Irudaya Rajan, Varghese and Jayakumar (2009) for details.
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be more than double of what they earned at home for both men and
women. In such a context the decision to emigrate was understandably
taken in search of a better standard of life and due to compulsions for
upward economic mobility.
Table 9: Reasons for Emigration as stated by Intending Emigrants
 Reasons Male Female Total Male Female Total
Inadequate income 311 99 410 69.89 47.37 62.69
Under-employment 53 52 105 11.91 24.88 16.06
Unemployment 18 34 52 4.04 16.27 7.95
Repayment of debts 25 20 45 5.62 9.57 6.88
Getting higher job 38 4 42 8.54 1.91 6.42
Total 445 209 654 100.0 100.0 100.0
This is the driving factor that makes a significant number of people
desperate to emigrate. The surveys reveal that a majority who emigrated
through RAs approached the latter on their own to realise their goal.
Among those who emigrated through RAs, 68.5 per cent approached
them directly for the same, while the RAs reached out to the rest, 31.5
per cent. More disturbing fact is that, among the latter category, only 4.8
per cent of the intending emigrants got hooked through advertisements
in the media. 52.4 per cent were canvassed by the RAs through relatives/
friends/neighbours of intending emigrants; 30.6 per cent were bagged
directly; 14.3 per cent were canvassed through sub-agents. This is true
with the emigrants who are currently on expatriate work, as reported by
their households. Among the emigrants who reportedly went through
private RAs, 85.3 per cent had approached the RAs by themselves for
arranging their expatriation. Only in the case of 14.7 per cent did the
RAs approach the migrants. This contrasts with the information supplied
by the RAs;  70.6 per cent of the RAs had stated that advertisements
were their major mode of contacting potential recruitees, while only
10.5 per cent stated that they employed own agents/field staff and 5 per
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cent agreed to have made use of networks of local agents for the purpose
of recruitment.  Strikingly, 13.9 per cent of the RAs make use of web
facilities too for this purpose.  However, most of them informally
acknowledged that it was not possible for them to get in touch with
sufficient number of potential recruitees without operating through a
network of local agents/ subagents/individuals affiliated to them either
directly or indirectly. The very fact that the majority of emigrants are
approaching the RAs by themselves shows that more than the vigorous
and deceptive canvassing on the part of agents, it is the gripping push
factors that drive the hapless intending emigrants to the RAs, presenting
the latter with an ideal opportunity to exploit the former and allowing
diverse players to masquerade as RAs.29
Though social network is considered to be the more dependable
channel for emigration compared to RAs, it too involves diverse players,
both authorised and unauthorised, as revealed by the present surveys.
Even though a vast majority of emigrants are reported to be migrating
through the channel of social network of relatives and friends, in many
of those cases other players like middlemen and visa merchants are also
involved. The overseas emigrants would be depending on such players
for arranging visa and facilitating the emigration of their relatives or
friends to the country where they work. Again, many of those who claimed
to have emigrated through friends/relatives might have depended upon
agents or middlemen who also happened to be their distant relatives or
friends. In many other instances, it is seen that the reported ‘friendship’
was a newly established one, mostly during the ‘deal’ of emigration.
The research team also came across several instances in which friends/
relatives were successfully made use of by the agents for canvassing
prospective recruitees.  In our present survey, only those who have
explicitly reported to have gone through private RAs have been recorded
29 Nonetheless, it is certain that the RAs have their own structures in place even
in remote places in the form of sub-agents or individual field agents ‘to be
contacted by the needy’.
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to have done so. This remains a major limitation of the present data as
well.
Added to this is an incredibly low-level of awareness among the
emigrants and intending emigrants about the diverse aspects and
intricacies of emigration and expatriate work. As has been already
pointed out, a majority of them have no clue about the legal status of the
RAs that arrange their emigration. Irrespective of the channel of
emigration, the intending emigrants are oblivious of many other crucial
issues also.  Only 36.5 per cent of the intending emigrants stated that
they were aware of the prevailing working and living conditions at the
destination. As many as 44 per cent among them did not know who their
sponsors were. Sixteen per cent of the sample admitted that they were
preparing to emigrate without any employment contracts. Even among
those who had signed the contracts, only 37 per cent were aware of the
provisions in the contract. Of the remaining 63 per cent, 38.6 per cent
had partial knowledge about the terms of the contract, but the rest, 24.4
per cent, were totally in the dark about the conditions of work. The vast
majority of the prospective emigrants, who come to the different POE
offices for emigration clearance, do not know the purpose for which the
office has been established and the real service being delivered by it. It
should also be noted that majority of Indian workers emigrating for
overseas work have low educational qualifications, are low in awareness
and belong to the unskilled, semi-skilled and low-skilled categories of
labour. The survey of emigrant household in select Kerala districts
underlines the low levels of educational attainment of the emigrants.
Table 10 shows that 62.26 per cent of the emigrants are educated only
up to Secondary School or even lower (21.40 per cent with ‘10th class
completed’ and 40.86 with even lower levels). If this is the situation
prevalent among emigrants from a ‘complete literate’ state like Kerala,
the conditions are likely to be worse in the case of emigrants from other
states. The educational profile of the current emigrants indicates that
though female participation in emigration is lower than that of men, the
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proportion of qualified emigrants is significantly higher among women
than among men.
Table 10: Educational Profile of the Emigrants in three districts of
Kerala (survey of emigrant households), 2007
Qualification Number Percent
Male Female Total Male Female Total
Less than 10th class 187 23 210 41.46 36.51 40.86
10th pass 103 7 110 22.84 11.11 21.40
Plus two 63 4 67 13.97 6.35 13.04
Technical 31 1 32 6.87 1.59 6.23
Degree 37 14 51 8.20 22.22 9.92
Professional degree 30 14 44 6.65 22.22 8.56
 Total 451 63 514 100 100 100
3.2 Mounting Costs and Rising Vulnerability
The ideal scenario for persons seeking employment overseas
would be one that is costless and fetches high return. However, the
reality is far removed from the ideal; and emigration, in most cases,
involves exorbitant cost.  As pointed out already, the prospects of earning
more from overseas in the face of gloomy options at home has instigated
many people to seek expatriate work. Many players have been attracted
into the recruitment process by the prospects of minting money in it. A
variety of players including employers, overseas recruiting and clearing
agents, contracting companies, RAs in India, touts, officials and even
friends/relatives of the overseas job seekers are involved in the chain, in
varying depth and intensity, taking advantage of the situation. There is
no altruism and all, except a few friends/relatives, are lured by the
lucrative nature of the process. This has made the cost of emigration
skyrocket under different heads and items.
The employment visa, which allows a foreign worker to be
employed in a given country, should ideally be issued free of cost to the
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worker. But in reality, the document has virtually become a marketable
commodity which could be sold and purchased. It is learnt that the trend
of making cash payments for obtaining employment visas is on the
increase, especially in the case of the Gulf countries. There are employers
who have made it a business to sell visas through local ‘labour
companies’, who in turn sell visas to RAs in the labour-sending countries.
The business of selling visas has brought more players into the field,
including unregistered agents, individual touts, etc. The great majority
of the RAs covered in the survey conceded that it is very difficult to get
visas, especially for the unskilled, semi-skilled and certain types of
skilled works, without payment, though only 29.7 per cent accepted
that they themselves are involved in purchasing visas.30 The survey of
intending emigrants too eloquently confirms this. All intending
emigrants who got their visas through RAs had to pay for their visa.
There was a wide variation in cost — the lowest being Rs.5,000 and the
highest Rs. 130,000. Among them only 17.5 per cent could manage to
get their visa for less than Rs.20,000 each, while 57.5 per cent spent Rs.
3 0 There is a clear regional difference in this matter; while only 15.5 per cent
of the RAs in the regions other than South India admittedly purchased visas,
a whopping 49.5 per cent of South Indian RAs resorted to this practice. This
would be also an indication of a higher demand for foreign employment in
South India compared to other parts of India, especially in lower category
jobs.
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20,001 to Rs. 50,000, another 17.5 per cent Rs. 50,001 to Rs.100,000
and 7.5 per cent higher than Rs.100,000 (Fig. 1). On an average, a person
emigrating through RAs paid Rs.45,495 as cost of visa.
Emigrating through social network would not necessarily provide
immunity from paying for visa. As many as 110 intending emigrants
(out of 515) who emigrated through friends/relatives were aware of the
specific component of ‘visa cost’ involved in their total cost of emigration.
On an average, an emigrant had to spend Rs. 33,248 for visa in
this category (Table-11). Among them 64.5 per cent paid more than Rs.
15,000 as visa cost, while the remaining 35.5 per cent less than Rs.
15,000.31  The range of payment for procuring visa –  the lowest being
Rs.1,000 and the highest Rs.1,25,000 – reveals that a significant number
of emigrations were not through social network per se. It indicates the
existence of a wide variety of players who mediate between the intending
emigrants and those friends/relatives who arrange their emigration.
However, out of the total 515 intending emigrants who emigrated
through friends/relatives, 405 (78.6 per cent) persons had not made any
payment towards the cost of visa. This may be read as an indication of
the fact that there are still chances of getting a visa free of cost from
companies/employers. Alternatively, this might be also due to the fact
that the relatives /friends concerned bore the cost on behalf of the
emigrants. The return emigrants who had emigrated through friends/
relatives during the last episode of their emigration too had spent less
for visa than those who went through RAs. Whereas the former had
spent Rs. 29,918 for visa, the latter had spent Rs.34,769.32
31 Only 8.2 per cent of them could get visa for an amount less than Rs.5000,
5.5 per cent paid Rs.5001- Rs.10,000; and 21.8 per cent 10,001-15,000.
32 As per the findings of the Emigrant Household survey, those who emigrated
through RAs had to spend Rs. 68,577 for their visa and those who went
through the social network paid slightly less, i.e., Rs. 65,074
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Table 11:  Cost for Visa by Intending Emigrants, if they emigrate
through relatives and friends, 2007
Rupees Male Female Total Male Female Total
0 - 5000 9 0 9 11.7 0.0 8.2
5000 - 10000 3 3 6 3.9 9.1 5.5
10000-15000 2 22 24 2.6 66.7 21.8
above 15000 63 8 71 81.8 24.2 64.5
Total 77 33 110 100.0 100.0 100.0
Average cost: 40238 16939 33248
This is true in the case of other items of cost involved like air-
travel, medical testing, insurance, emigration clearance, etc. Most of the
RAs agreed informally that the cost of travel is usually been borne by
the recruitee.33  Most of the RAs are IATA licence holders and undertake
the business of air-ticketing along with recruitment.34 A quarter of the
intending emigrants emigrating through RAs (25.7 per cent) spent more
than Rs.15,000 towards air tickets,  whereas only 10.5 per cent of those
went through friends/relatives had to spend that much. While those who
emigrated through RAs spent an average of Rs.13,170 for the air ticket,
those who did so through friends/relatives spent a slightly lower amount
of Rs.12,233. There are countries that require medical fitness certificate
prior to emigration. The medical test conducted prior to the emigration
in the home country is also used as a money-minting segment in overseas
recruitment.35 Some of the RAs were frank enough to disclose that in
33 However, only 49.5 per cent conceded it by formally in their answers to
questionnaire; the remaining 48.6 per cent had replied that the employers
bore all the travel costs.
34 Out of the total sample, 77 per cent of the RAs are into air ticketing business
and extend the service to their recruitees. The remaining 23 per cent arranged
the air tickets through their associate travel agencies.
35 There are countries that require medical fitness certificate prior to emigration.
In the case of GCC countries, for instance, only GAMCA (GCC Approved
Medical Centres and Associations) licence holders are entitled to give medical
fitness certificates to the intending emigrants. There are nearly 200 GAMCA
licence holders worldwide today, CARAM Asia Report on State of Health of
Migrants – 2007, pp. 187-90.
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general they earn a fair amount of money as commission from diagnostic
centres and many of them meet their running costs from it. It is alleged
that out of the total Rs.1,500 usually charged by diagnostic centres for
medical fitness certificate from recruitees, the RA forwarding the case to
the diagnostic centre would get between Rs. 300 and Rs. 600 as
commission. The survey shows that 72.9 per cent of the intending
emigrants going through RAs spent between Rs. 1001-2000 for medical
tests and 10.4 per cent spent more than Rs. 2000, while only 16.7 per
cent spent Rs.1000 or less (Fig: 2).36
Some of them could get their medical examination done at a cost
of Rs. 500, whereas a few had to spend as much as Rs. 4,200. On an
average, a person spent Rs.1,606 for the medical test. The return
emigrants’ survey also showed that there was enormous differences in
the amounts paid which ranged from Rs.600 to Rs.10,000 with an average
of Rs. 2,642. The discrepancy also raises serious doubts about the
credibility of tests being conducted. The case of insurance is not different
either.  The RAs allegedly receive a commission from insurance
companies/agents to whom they sent the recruitees for obtaining the
36 Of the intending emigrants who were emigrating through RAs, 50 per cent
got the medical test done through the agents by paying extra amounts as the
RA’s commission. The remaining got it done ‘on their own’. But it is
evident from the field inquiry that, even when the RAs sent their recruitees
‘directly’ (apparently with a chit), to the diagnostic centres, they get their
commission from the latter.
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mandatory insurance cover.  Among the intending emigrants, those who
emigrate through RAs, on an average, spent Rs.1074 for insurance,37
while the amount was only Rs. 684 for those who emigrated through
friends/relatives.
The disparity is apparent in the expenses incurred for ‘emigration
clearance’ too. The stipulated government fee for emigration clearance
is Rs. 200 per passport. The average spending by the persons emigrating
trough RAs in this regard is Rs. 772 and Rs. 285 for others going through
the social network. The average amount incurred by the return emigrants
for this was exorbitantly high, that is, Rs. 2,995. This in fact points to a
parallel mechanism of ‘emigration clearance service’, in which emigrants
take the service of RAs for getting their emigration clearance done,
even when they are emigrating through the social network. We will
come back to this point a little later.
The service charges of the RAs are also exorbitant. 38  Among
those intending migrants who had replied to the component of service
charges in their questionnaire, 27.3 per cent had paid to the RAs Rs.
10,000 or less; 40.9 per cent Rs.10,001-30,000 and 31.8 per cent, more
than Rs.30,000.  On an average, a person had spent Rs.23,500 on service
charges. There were a few intending emigrants who approached
recruiting/travel agencies to “arrange” their documents, which could
even involve forging documents. Out of the 515 intending migrants
who emigrated through friends/relatives, 37 persons (7.9 per cent) chose
this path and paid high service charges to the agency - an average of Rs.
12,147 per person.
37 It was in 2003 the Government of India introduced the compulsory insurance
scheme, namely Pravasi Bharatiya Bima Yojana, to provide protection to
the unskilled and semi-skilled emigrants under the ECR category in case of
eventualities and misfortunes happening during their expatriate lives.
38 Protector General of Emigrants,  Emigration & You: An Information Booklet,
New Delhi: Ministry of Labour, Government of India, 2004, p. 16.
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Table 12: Total cost (in Rupees) of Emigration in Six Locations in
India when emigrating through RA, 2007
POE Location Number Average  Minimum Maximum
Cost
Delhi 10 44120 11200 70000
Ernakulam 14 47429 14000 130000
Hyderabad 3 46667 25000 80000
Kolkata 19 30084 1000 60000
Mumbai 9 50306 13200 73200
Thiruvananthapuram 33 68428 500 140000
Total 88 51451 500 140000
The inordinate costs under various heads clearly boost up the
overall cost of emigration. Among the intending emigrants going through
RAs, only 13.6 per cent could succeed by spending an amount of Rs.
20,000 or less, 24.3 per cent between Rs.20,001-50,000, 36.4 per cent
between Rs.50,001-1,00,000 and the remaining 5.7 per cent above
Rs.100,000. On an average, a person spent Rs. 51,451 as the total cost of
his/her emigration (Table 12). The range of overall cost of emigration
from a mere Rs. 500 to as much as Rs. 1,40,000, yet again signals the
existence of both fair players and extremely exploitative foul players in
the field. Fig. 3 shows the total cost (with its minimum, average and
maximum) incurred by the intending emigrants in different POE locations
when they had engaged RAs to accomplish their goal.39 Kolkata recorded
the lowest average cost and Thiruvananthapuram, the highest.
Thiruvananthapuram clearly reflects volatility of the situation – some
could emigrate for a paltry Rs.500, but some others could do so only
after they spent as much as Rs.1,40,000.
39 The cost from Chandigarh and Chennai are not available as none of the
intending emigrants from these locations in the sample emigrated through
RAs.
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The emigrant household survey also confirms that some people
were able to emigrate spending Rs.15,000, whereas some others had to
spend as much as Rs. 2,17,500. The average cost per person for emigration
through RAs was Rs.76,820.40 The intending emigrants emigrating
through friends and relatives too had to spend significant amounts, but
certainly not to the extent their counterparts emigrating through RAs
had to spend. A quarter of the intending emigrants going through friends/
relatives spent only below Rs. 5,000, 36.5 per cent beween Rs.5001-
20,000 and 24.4 per cent between Rs.20,001-50,000. The remaining
14.2 per cent spent more than Rs. 50,000. On an average, a person spent
Rs. 25,712. In this category, the lowest reported cost is Rs. 200 and the
highest, an exorbitant Rs.1,65,000 (Table 13). If the average is calculated
after excluding the 110 persons who paid for the visa, as their relatives
arguably purchased the visa from some agencies, the average total cost
would be Rs. 16,358.
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40 See Irudaya Rajan, Varghese and Jayakumar (2009) for details.
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Table 13. Total Cost of Emigration across 8 Locations (through
friends/relatives) 2007.
POE Location Average Minimum Maximum
Chandigarh 15412 672 35500
Chennai 32208 200 100000
Delhi 37880 200 125000
Ernakulam 29194 200 165000
Hyderabad 18905 650 50000
Kolkata 20140 5000 40200
Mumbai 6104 750 49750
Thiruvananthapuram 44375 1500 150000
Total 25712 200 165000
The return emigrants survey too brings out similar results, though
not as noticeably as the other two surveys (Table 14). The average total
cost incurred by the return emigrants whose emigration was facilitated
by private RAs during their last episode of emigration was Rs. 38,507
compared to Rs. 36,212 for those whose emigration was facilitated by
friends/relatives. All the three surveys which tried to capture the costs of
emigration show that those who emigrated through the channel of RAs
had to spend more compared to those who emigrated through the channel
of Friends/Relatives (Fig. 4).
There is apparent difference in the cost of emigration across
locations, indicating once again the wobbling nature of the sector (Fig.5).
RAs are found to be extracting huge sums from the intending emigrants.
Expenditure is relatively less though the channel of social network.
However, the social network channel also does not offer any immunity
from excessive expenditure.
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Table 14: Cost of emigration (in Rs) of Return Emigrants who
emigrated  through R As and FRs, 2007
Through RAs     Through Friends/Relatives
Item of Average Minimum Maximum Average Minimum Maximum
Expenditure
Visa fee 34769 6000 65000 31800 3000 100000
Medical test 1320 500 2000 2318 600 10000
Emigration
clearance 4375 500 15000 2994 350 7500
Travel fare 7900 3400 17500 12305 500 22000
Total 38507 6000 175000 36212 1000 100000
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3.3   Acquired Capability and Returning to Insufficiency
The exorbitant costs involved in the emigration process would
give an impression that only those persons with adequate economic
resources would be able to nurture an idea of emigrating. But the surveys
indicate that a majority of the low skilled migrants do not have the
financial capability to emigrate on their own. This compels them to
acquire the capability through measures like borrowing and/or disposal
of their basic assets. Among those intending emigrants who sought
emigration through RAs, 50.6 per cent had mobilised funds for the same
either by borrowing or by disposing of their assets. The proportion of
persons who resorted to borrowing was 39 per cent. Of these, the share of
those who borrowed from moneylenders alone was 19.5 per cent, from
financial institutions - 10.4 per cent, and friends/relatives - 9.1 per cent.
It is noteworthy that 11.7 per cent mobilised funds by selling assets
including jewellery and landed property. More women were seen to
borrow (50 per cent) from moneylenders to finance their emigration
than their male counterparts. As many as 46.8 per cent of the intending
emigrants, who plan to emigrate through friends/relatives, also resorted
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to borrowing. Here also, more women borrowed than men to finance
their journey abroad. The results from the emigrant household survey
are not different either. More than half of the emigrants reportedly
mobilised finance either by selling off their assets or resorting to
borrowing. While 21.5 per cent sold off the jewellery of their spouses or
parents, 20.8 per cent borrowed from private moneylenders and 9.1 per
cent took loans from banks.  Nearly half of female emigrants (47.2 per
cent) depended on private moneylenders to raise funds for emigration,
while only 16.7 per cent of male counterparts had to do that. Even after
enormous spending, only 78.08 per cent of them were able to emigrate with
valid employment visas. Hoping for better prospects, 2.15 per cent emigrated
for work with what is called ‘free visa’, but an alarming 19.18 per cent
emigrated under ‘visit visa’ and 0.6 per cent went on ‘pilgrim visa’.
The most distressing aspect of the situation is that even after
spending substantial resources and that too after obtaining those
resources at a heavy cost, most of the emigrants are not getting a
reasonable return for their investment. And the lack of correspondence
between the investment for emigration and the insubstantial returns
from the overseas employment is astounding (Table 15). More than 60
per cent of the current emigrants earn less than Rs.10,000 a month. The
remittances emigrants send home is another indicator of the insufficient
earnings they make from the expatriate work. About one-third of the
emigrants (32.9 per cent) are able to send home only Rs. 2,500 or less
per month. Nearly half of them (47.6 per cent) could send between Rs.
2,501-5,000, 15 per cent between Rs. 5,001-10,000 and only 4.6 per
cent, above Rs.10,000.  Women fared better than men here as in the case
of earning, though none of them transferred more than Rs.10,000 at a
time.41 It should also be noted that less than half the number of emigrants
(45.6 per cent) reportedly send remittances every month; 16.6 per cent
do it quarterly; 1.7 per cent, biannually and 35.6 per cent, in quite an
41 While 50 per cent of the women emigrants are earning more than Rs.
10,000 a month, only 39 per cent of men are able to achieve it (Table 15).
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irregular manner. An emigrant who is incapable of emigrating on his/her
own with regard to the investment required for it, and resorts to borrowing
to render him/her ‘capable’, would get bogged down in the vicious
cycle of endless borrowings. Moreover, only 33.2 per cent of the emigrant
households reported that emigration had brought them some economic
dividends (Table 16). The reasons cited by the return emigrants why
they returned provide further insight into the problem (Table 17).42
Almost 70 per cent of the return emigrants never would like to emigrate
again, and this was not because their stint abroad had made them
economically independent for the rest of their lives.43 Almost half of the
return emigrants who did not wish to emigrate again stated that they
were no longer able to work either due to old age or ill-health (Table 18).
It is quite apparent that exorbitant investment for emigration does not
guarantee a reasonable yield from expatriate earnings and an easy life
after return.
Table 15: Salary of Emigrants as reported by the Emigrant
Households, 2007
Salary range Number Percent
Male Female Total Male Female Total
Rs. 1-5000 34 4 38 7.9 16.7 8.4
Rs. 5001 – 10000 228 8 236 52.9 33.3 51.9
Rs. 10001 – 15000 92 0 92 21.3 0.0 20.2
Rs. 15001 – 20000 26 5 31 6.0 20.8 6.8
Rs. 20001 – 25000 13 3 16 3.0 12.5 3.5
Above Rs. 25000 38 4 42 8.8 16.7 9.2
Total 431 24 455 100.0 100.0 100.0
42 Expiry of contract, low remuneration, ill-health, problems at home, miserable
working and living conditions and compulsory repatriation by the employer
are the major reasons cited for return.
43 Only 8.1 per cent of the return emigrants who did not want to re-emigrate
have stated that they earned adequately and thus did not need to emigrate
again.
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Table 16 : Forms of dividends brought by emigration,  Emigrant
Households, 2007
Economic Number Percent
Dividends
Male Female Total Male Female Total
House 46 3 49 31.1 27.3 30.8
Buildings 27 4 31 18.2 36.4 19.5
Landed
property 31 1 32 20.9 9.1 20.1
Vehicles 2 0 2 1.4 0.0 1,3
Children’s
education 23 1 24 15.5 9.1 15.1
Marriage of
daughters 7 0 7 4.7 0.0 4.4
Own savings 12 2 14 8.1 18.2 8.8
Total 148 11 159 100.0 100.0 100.0
Table 17:  Reasons for Return as stated by the Return Migrants, 2007
Reasons for Number Percent
return Male Female Total Male Female Total
Expiry of
contract 74 5 79 24.3 22.7 24.2
Compulsory
repartition by
the employer 25 0 25 8.2 0.0 7.6
Due to low
remuneration 60 0 60 19.7 0.0 18.3
Ill-health 61 4 65 20.0 18.2 19.9
Problems at home
home 39 9 48 12.8 40.9 14.7
Miserable
working and
living conditions 26 3 29 8.5 13.6 8.9
Harsh behavior
of the employer 15 1 16 4.9 4.5 4.9
Hostile climate
conditions 5 0 5 1.6 0.0 1.5
Total 305 22 327 100.0 100.0 100.0
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Table 18: Reasons for not emigrating again as stated by the Return
Migrants, 2007
Reasons for note Number Percent
migrating  again Male Female Total Male Female Total
Have earned
adequately 17 0 17 8.5 0.0 8.1
Attractive
opportunities
at home 41 3 44 20.5 33.3 21.1
Retired from
work due to
old age 45 6 51 22.5 66.7 24.4
Retired from
work due to
ill-health 45 0 45 22.5 0.0 21.5
Started own
business 17 0 17 8.5 0.0 8.1
Re-employed
in Kerala 35 0 35 17.5 0.0 16.7
Total 200 9 209 100.0 100.0 100.0
4. Buying Multiple Vulnerabilities: Host and Home Countries
All surveys conducted in connection with the present study reveal
that people emigrating through recruiting agents stand increasingly
exposed to likelihood of exploitation and cheating. Among those
intending emigrants who had previous experience of emigration through
the RAs, 21.6 per cent were subjected to incidents of false promises and
outright cheating. Surprisingly, 78.8 per cent of such deceitful agents
are reported to be still functioning and are reportedly going strong in
the business. The available evidence strongly indicates that emigration
through RAs could make emigrants vulnerable at destinations in multiple
ways.
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A major cause of concern is related to the employment contract,
which is a mandatory requirement of emigration clearance. It is found
that, most often, RAs get their clearance done with specimen contracts
in duplicate, resulting in a situation in which an actual contract is not
signed at all.44 Strikingly, 23.3 per cent of those intending emigrants
with previous migration experience through RAs did not sign the contract
at all before leaving India. More importantly, the survey reveals that a
significant proportion (17.8 per cent) of RAs are either ignorant about
the mandatory requirement or deliberately ignore the requirement of
signing of the contracts. Smaller recruiting agents are found to be more
at fault on this point.45 The vast majority of RAs (83.2 per cent) have
stated that they submit only specimen contracts to the POEs, since a
specimen contract can satisfy the technical requirement for emigration
clearance.46 The actual contract is mostly not signed at all; and, even if
it is signed once the worker reached the destination, the chances of the
employer insisting on a new contract to his/her advantage are high. All
these makes the worker vulnerable to abuses and the terms and conditions
of the contract, in whatever form, is largely violated, particularly with
regard to salary, type of job, working and living conditions, etc. The
survey of return emigrants casts doubts on the sanctity of the employment
contract because 34 per cent of the return emigrants were not given the
promised job; 12 per cent were forced to sign fresh contracts; and for 29
per cent the working and living conditions were not on par with what
were agreed upon in the contract. Needless to say that such
44 In some other cases, documents are forged outright, as happened in the
recent CBI charge-sheeted case in Thiruvananthapuram involving the POE
office and 18 travel agencies.
45 Only 8.2 per cent of the ‘1000 plus ’ RAs have reportedly did this; while it
is 23 per cent in the case of ‘up to 300’ category of RAs.
46 Section 15 (c) of the Emigration Rules, 1983.  But as we see a little later, the
POEs are insisting upon the requirement that specimen contract needs to be
authenticated by the concerned Indian Mission.
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vulnerabilities are at a significantly higher level when emigration is
through RAs.47
Seizing passports of expatriate workers immediately after their
arrival in the countries where they go for work has been reported as a
major incapacitating measure adopted by the employers, particularly
with regard to unskilled and semi-skilled workers. A majority of the
return emigrants (55 per cent) were not allowed to keep their passports
and work permits with them, and the documents were taken away by
their employers. Among those who emigrated through channels other
than private RAs, 46.7 per cent were allowed to keep their passports and
work permits with them. But among those who emigrated through RAs,
only 24.32 per cent had this advantage. Recruiting agents put the blame
squarely on workers, rationalising the situation on the grounds that
employers resort to such measures to ensure that workers do not desert
them midstream. This practice, aimed at making the workers obedient
and compliant to the respective employers, continues unabated in spite
of the efforts on the part of many governments to stop it.48 Most often,
due to extreme harassment, the workers run away from the employer.
That makes them illegal workers in the foreign country and consequently
more vulnerable. The practice of confiscating passports on arrival from
them by the  employers has virtually put the immigrant workers under a
“new form of slavery.” The denial of the fundamentals of citizenship
often starts on the workers’ arrival at the destination; it is reported that
the workers have to wait for hours or even days together in the airports
without being picked up to transport them to their living/working places.
More than 30 per cent of the return emigrants disclosed that neither the
employers nor their representatives were present in the airport at the
47 See for details: Irudaya Rajan, Varghese and Jayakumar (2009).
48 To cite one instance, one of the major concerns of the newly formed Labour
Market Regulatory Authority (LMRA) in Bahrain is to ensure that the
passports of the expatriate workers remain in their own possession.
.
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49 This pertains particularly to those emigrating through RAs, as the question
is not relevant for those who emigrate through genuine social networks
50 “Presently 30 men use one bathroom. Water heaters have not been provided
in the winter and so we have to bathe in cold water…. There are no room
heaters either…We are living in conditions that are not fit even for animals.”-
narrates a worker among the 2,000 odd workers who were on strike in the
GP Zachariades Overseas Ltd. Quoted in “We will Continue Our Strike,”  10
February, 2008, Bahrain Tribune.
51 Two thousand workers in GP Zachariades Overseas Ltd., 400 workers from
Technical Construction Company (TCC), 750 workers of Almoayyed
Contracting, over 300 employees of Mohsen Hajji Ali Group and 1,800
workers of Bopkhowa Constructions went on strike in Bahrain in recent
times for breach of promises, low salary and poor living conditions.
52 In a recent incident at Dubai, UAE police arrested more than 300 workers,
mostly Indians, after a dining room riot at a construction site. The reason
for the riot is reportedly the extremely poor quality of food served to the
workers when managers enjoyed a different mess. “India seeks workers’
release,” July 10, 2008, Bahrain Tribune.
time of their arrival to pick them up.49 This results in a traumatic spell of
waiting, especially for the first-timers, in an alien country, often without
contacts and adequate money to survive.
4.1 Pitiable Life, Debt Trap and Increasing Suicides
Excessive investments, denial of promised salaries, wretched work
and living conditions and other forms of exploitation, all having direct
or indirect connection with recruitment, makes the life of the majority
of unskilled and semi-skilled workers miserable in the destination
countries, particularly in the Gulf region. Apart from taking cuts in the
promised salaries, employers deduct a specified amount every month
from the salary towards recovering the visa charges, air travel cost and
other expenses from the expatriates. Horrendously, such deductions
happen even in cases where the workers paid hefty sums to the RAs back
home. The conditions in most of the labour camps where the immigrant
workers are housed by the companies in the Gulf region are extremely
pitiable.50 The discontent among the workers, for all these reasons, is on
the rise resulting in an unprecedented number of strikes and riots in the
Gulf region where law bans labour strikes.51 Riots in the dining halls,
presumably because of poor quality of food served, are not uncommon.52
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Extreme discontent and trauma also gets reflected in the increasing rate
of suicides among Indian expatriate workers in the Gulf region. According
to statistics compiled by the Consulate General of India in Dubai,
suicides by Indian expatriates in the UAE rose more than three-fold
between 2003 and 2008 (Figure. 6).
Source: “Debts to Deaths” 2nd August 2008, Khaleej Times
Since the figures for 2008 are not available for the full year, the
available figures (till July 92 suicides) are projected up for the entire
year. As much as 75 per cent of these suicides were attributed to debts,
15 per cent to domestic strife and 10 per cent to job-related stress.53 The
financial commitments that accrue from the emigration process coupled
with towering expectations by the society at home from the expatriate
worker often drive the workers into a debt trap, leading to depression
and eventually to the extreme step.
4.2 Illegal Migrations: Structures in the Destination Countries
The field of overseas recruitment is immensely complicated. The
problems are not limited to the RAs in India alone. There are plenty of
53 Dhanusha Gokulan, “Debt, Main Cause of Rise in Suicide Cases Among
Indian Expats: Study,” 2 October 2008, Khaleej Times.
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54 There are official conformations to this. For instance, Dr. Waleed Al-
Tabtabaei, the Chairman of the Parliamentary Human Rights Committee of
Kuwait shares this view. See, the news item “Government to Crack down on
Illegal Labour Merchants,” 5 August 2008,  Bahrain Tribune.
55 Minister’s statement quoted in Bahrain Tribune, 21 February 2008.
56 For instance, according to the Saudi Arabian Labour Minister, in Jeddah
alone 45 firms ceased their activities recently, after obtaining visas to bring
foreign workers into the kingdom; quoted in a news item, “45 Firms vanish
after obtaining visas in Saudi Arabia,” 23 July 2008, Khaleej Times.
recruiting companies and visa merchants operating in the destination
countries also, who establish links with registered and unregistered RAs
in India, to carry out their business. Many such unscrupulous foreign
players operate through individual agents working in the interior labour
catchment areas of the country. A good number of friends/relatives
working in the destination countries also approach such players to buy
visas for their aspiring kith and kin. Many of the governments in the
Gulf region are finding it difficult to crack down on illegal visa merchants
operating in their respective countries. The workers who reach the
destination countries on visas arranged by such visa merchants  invariably
face the risk of illegality and the consequent ill treatment.54 Most of the
Gulf countries have a licensed regime for overseas recruitment.
Nevertheless, there also exists a strong parallel economy run by illegal
agents who ‘collude’ with non-operational shady employers and firms
known as ‘ghost companies’. Ghost firms exist only on paper and function
exclusively for the purpose of getting visas sanctioned from the respective
governments. Both unlicensed and licensed agents reportedly resort to
this channel to get employment visas. There is official confirmation on
the pervasive ‘existence’ of ghost firms. According to Dr. Majeed Al
Alawi, the Minister of Labour, Bahrain, 70 per cent of construction
companies operating in the Kingdom of Bahrain are ghost firms.55 Our
own field research in Bahrain has confirmed this. The case of other Gulf
countries is not different either.56 This practice has led to the ‘free visa’
system; the persons who arrive on such visas are argued to be  ‘free’ to
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work for anyone. Another important group of players in the Gulf region
are ‘clearing agents’. They take care of the lengthy process and intricate
formalities of obtaining work permits and visas for the employers. Among
them there are agencies that misuse the documents issued by the
companies/employers; they forge signatures and create forged documents
to apply for work permits and visas.  The work permits and visas thus
issued are sold to expatriates and agents. It is also a point in case that
since the majority of the workers deployed through RAs are not equipped
with the required level of skills, as visas are sold to the wanted and not
offered to the qualified/skilled, the contracting companies are often
forced to demand work permits for more workers than they actually
need for a project.
Emigration for work on visit visas is also on the increase. Shady
companies in collusion with RAs in the sending countries charge
Rs.80,000 to Rs. 1,20,000 for obtaining a visit visa for an  emigrant and
dump such workers once the visa period gets expired.57 It is not surprising
that a significant proportion of amnesty seekers in the Gulf region had
arrived on visit visas.58 Many arrived on a false conviction that the
document would afford them full freedom to work anywhere without
the obligation of reporting exclusively to a particular boss. There are
employers who intentionally resort to the strategy of bringing workers
on visit visas to beat the demographic balancing policies of their states.
For them, the cost involved is lower and time needed for processing is
less. They use visit visas to bring in workers belonging to nationalities
of their choice and making them completely docile. Ever since the
government lifted the condition of obtaining ‘suspension of emigration
57 There are plenty of media reports on this from the Gulf region. See for
instance, “Hired, brought in and duped: visa trade continues despite vigil,”
6 August 2008, Bahrain Tribune.
58 It is reported that 35 per cent of the amnesty seekers in Bahrain in February
2008 had arrived there on visit visas. It was reportedly 41 percent in
November 2007.
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clearance’ for ECR passport holders to travel to the specified 17 countries
on visit visas (since October 1, 2007), this channel of emigration does
not have to confront any institutional barriers from the Indian side.
Many RAs have confirmed that a large number of workers are emigrating
to Iraq. After reaching countries like the UAE, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia
on visit visas, they proceed to Iraq, circumventing the ban of emigration
to Iraq by the Indian Government. Most of these workers are reportedly
paying as much as Rs.1,50,000 in cash to the unscrupulous agents at
home who arrange the passage to Iraq in collusion with overseas players
in the transit points and destination.59 All these underline the fact that
the parallel economy of illegal migration has acquired well-knit
structures functioning in the destination countries. However, the current
institutional framework of emigration governance in India is not
adequately informed of the functioning of these overseas players who
tremendously influence the overseas labour market and the recruitment
practices. There is strong nexus between such overseas players and the
local RAs, which is indicated by the veiled acknowledgement by most
of the RAs surveyed that they are forced to liaison with foreign RAs and
contracting companies to purchase visas, due to the stiff competition in
the field.
4.3 Multiple Players at Home and Lack of Transparency
One of the major problems in the overseas recruitment through
RAs is the extensive involvement of sub-agents and individual touts in
the process of recruiting. This is illegal as per the emigration rules.60
The majority of RAs in India are operating either without branches or
with a single branch.61  A majority of the RAs and their branches (95 per
59 There are considerable media reports on this, see for instance, “For a few
Dollars More” 1 February 2008, Khaleej Times.
60 Emigration Rules 1983, 10 (viii).
61 Recruiting Agents survey, See Irudaya Rajan, Varghese and Jayakumar
(2009).
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cent as per the survey) are located in the urban areas. In such a situation,
the RAs very often rely upon the services of sub-agents and individual
touts for reaching out to prospective customers in remote rural catchment
areas. Moreover, when local RAs establish a nexus with foreign recruiting
agents and contracting companies and purchase visas, there is pressure on
them to recruit the required number of people by hook or crook. As pointed
out earlier, a majority of the RAs do actually engage such sub-agents and
peddling individual touts in the recruitment process. This makes emigration
not only an excessively expensive affair but also a risky one.
Similarly, the reporting of RAs are far from convincing with regard
to the sources on which they rely for obtaining employment visas and
information on vacancies. The majority of RAs covered in the present
survey (78.9 per cent) claimed that they receive information regarding
employment opportunities directly from overseas employers. This is far
from truth as, in our informal interactions with them, the bulk of the
RAs, admitted that their reliance on foreign RAs, agents and contracting
companies for information regarding employment opportunities is on
the increase. However, on record, only 7.66 per cent of them have
acknowledged that they received information about vacancies from
such agencies abroad.  Another 3.83 per cent agreed that they depended
on ‘agents of the employers’ for the purpose. Only 2.2 per cent of RAs
maintain their own offices in the destination countries to gather
information on vacancies.62
Another shady area in overseas recruitment is the selection process
of workers. It is noticed that due to the shortage of candidates with the
required skills on the one hand and the greed of many RAs on the other,
many unqualified persons have been selected for deployment. However,
in the survey, a majority of the RAs refused to accept this as a reality;
90.1 per cent of them stated that the foreign employers used to participate
62 See Irudaya Rajan, Varghese and Jayakumar (2009) for a category and
region-wise distribution.
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directly in the process of recruitment and had the final say in selection
matters.  Conversely, there were instances where employers/foreign
labour companies directly selected personnel in India but failed to locate
them in their country. They were substituted by others on pay by the
RA. This was the experience of one of the foreign labour companies,
with whom the research team had a chance to interact.63
The RAs usually receive a number of complaints from their
recruitees after deployment. The incidence of complaints may be
considered as a window to get a sense of the breach of promise and
cheating involved. More than half of the RAs candidly admitted that
they used to get various kinds of complaints from their recruitees. Of the
RAs who admitted to having received such complaints, 56 per cent of
the complaints were related to working conditions, accommodation
and food; 15 per cent to remuneration, the rate of remuneration and non-
payment or delay of payment, and the remaining 31 per cent related to
grievances on non-compliance with the offered jobs or there being no
jobs at all. The vast majority of the RAs either privately resolve the
matter or pay no attention at all to it. Among those RA who used to pay
attention to such grievances almost three-fourth refuses to resolve it by
informing the official establishments of the Government of India both
within and outside the country.
The majority of the RAs were reluctant to divulge the details
regarding the quantum of recruitments they had done in the previous
year.  More than 50 per cent of them refused outright to give the number,
and the rest relented only after much persuasion. Even then, most of
them gave the investigators a feeling that what they furnished was a
significantly scaled down number-  55.1 per cent of those who responded
reported that they recruited less than 200 emigrants only during the
previous year (2006). Of them, 16.2 per cent reported to have recruited
less than 50, 21.2 per cent between 51 and 100 and 17.7 per cent between
63 See for details: Irudaya Rajan, Varghese and Jayakumar (2009).
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101 and 200 persons.64 The remaining 44.9 per cent of RAs admitted to
having recruited more than 200 candidates. The larger RAs could send
more workers than their smaller counterparts- 70.8 per cent of the
‘above1000’ category of RAs sent more than 200 workers to foreign
destinations, whereas only 13.2 per cent of the ‘up to 300’ category
could send 200 or more emigrants during 2006. If the numbers provided
by the RAs are true, then it is very well evident that most of the RAs
functioning in the country do not get an adequate quantum of business.
At least two adverse implications may be drawn from this information:
first, there would be pressure on the RAs to go to any possible extent to
survive, and second, the few emigrants recruited by such RAs in all
possibility would be charged sky-high.
However, the reported number of recruitments made by the RAs
appears incorrect. The data provided by the MOIA on the number of
emigration clearances given annually and the approximate number of
emigration clearances given on a normal day of functioning (as reported
by the POEs) far exceeds what is conceded by the RAs.65 This difference
is not only because of the hesitation on the part of the RAs to divulge
the actual numbers but also because of the parallel stream of emigration
clearances done by the agents without performing actual recruitment. A
significant number of RAs have admitted that their main work is just to
obtain emigration clearance for intending emigrants and not  recruitment
for overseas employment at all. The RAs do this ‘service’ for the intending
emigrants who approach them by getting emigration clearance for them
using forged or fake Demand Letter and Power of Attorney, after charging
reportedly  between Rs.3,000 to Rs. 15,000 per passport based on the
64 See for category-wise and region-wise distribution, Irudaya Rajan, Varghese
and Jayakumar (2009).
65 676,912 workers were given emigration clearance in 2006, 809,453 in
2007 and 848,601 in 2008 (MOIA, 2009). As reported by the POEs, on a
normal day of functioning, the eight offices together are giving as many as
3275 emigration clearances to intending emigrants applied through RAs
(Table 20).
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‘risk’ involved in each case.66 This is also corroborated by the survey on
the return emigrants. It is found that out of those return emigrants who
sought emigration clearance during their last emigration episode, only
26.5 per cent had obtained it directly while the remaining 73.5 per cent
had obtained it through travel/service/recruitment agencies. Unauthorised
RAs and travel agents who are involved in the process act as part of a
network, and eventually an authorised RA submits the applications in the
POE office for clearance.
This task is mostly performed by the RAs in collusion with the
POE offices. The POE offices and RAs themselves see it as a safer option,
as the applicants acquire the travel documents through their social
network, through unauthorised RAs and touts would not hold the POE
officials and RAs responsible for the problems the emigrants are likely
to confront at the destination. But this procedure has got other
implications also. The RAs can push papers of potential emigrants whom
they recruited for ghost companies by giving the POE an impression
that the applications are for ‘emigration clearance service’. In the recent
corruption case at Trivandrum, against a former POE and 18 RAs, this
had allegedly taken place. According to the charge sheet filed by the
CBI, Rs. 250 to Rs.1,000 was offered to the POE office as bribe for
clearing each application and 300 to 500 people were given emigration
clearance certificates daily from the office.  A good number of these
might be ‘emigration clearance services’. But it is learnt that the RAs
and the POE apparently acted in collusion with a ‘mafia group’ that
manufacture visas in the name of ghost companies. Those who reached
the Gulf countries on such visas, according to the charge sheet, were
found either wandering about without jobs or were finding new jobs on
their own after a traumatic period of job hunt and agony.67
66 See for details, Irudaya Rajan, Varghese and Jayakumar (2009).
67 Details of the charge sheet from the news item, “Immigration Kaikkuli:
Protector Ravuvinethire CBI” (Immigration Bribe: CBI against Protector
Rao), 2 January 2009, Malayala Manorama daily.
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It was noticed that the number of registered RAs engaged in
overseas recruitment are far lower than the number of agents actually
registered with the Protector General of Emigrants.  As per the
information given on the website of the Ministry of Overseas Indian
Affairs, till 14th March 2005, 4,330 registration certificates had been
issued to RAs by the PGE. But the list of registered RAs as provided by
the MOIA contains details of only 1,820 agents with names and
addresses. Out of 1,820 registered RAs, only 1,406 are functioning in
the eight cities in which the POE offices are located. However, only
591 RAs are said to be active at  present (Table 19). The advantages of
retaining the licence or registration certificate, even when they are not
actually engaged in any recruitment activity need to be investigated
further.
Table 19: Number of Registered RAs and actually functioning RAs in
POE locations, 2007
Cities Registered Actively Difference
Agencies functioning
(2005) RAs (current)
Chandigarh 47 20 -27
Chennai 171 35 -136
Delhi 331 50 -281
Kochi 88 50 -38
Hyderabad 47 30 -17
Kolkata 9 6 -3
Mumbai 650 300 -350
Thiruvananthapuram 63 100 +37
TOTAL 1406 591 -815
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4.4 Bypassing Legality and ‘Pushing’ towards Illegality
A matter for grave concern is that a considerable number of
emigrants appear to be bypassing the legal channel and wittingly or
unwittingly opting for illegal channels. The return emigrant’s survey
reveals that a significant number of them emigrated without getting
emigration clearance even though they were required to get it. Out of
the 79.1 per cent of return emigrants who were required by law to obtain
emigration clearance before they emigrated, only 37.7 per cent had
sought it and the remaining 40.4 per cent emigrated without it or were
not aware of that requirement. ‘Pushing’ is perhaps the most prevalent
method for accomplishing this, which allows ECR category workers to
pass through the airports without emigration clearance. A nexus between
agents and emigration authorities in the airports facilitates this.68 Illegal
emigration happens due to a variety of reasons. The incongruities
between what is considered legal and what is considered illegal among
the sending and receiving countries is one thing. For instance, if a person
bypasses emigration clearance in India and emigrates, this would not
make his/her status ‘illegal’ in the destination country. If a person
emigrates on visit visa and chooses to seek employment in the country
he is visiting, this too would not make his/her status illegal in the
countries of the Middle East, provided he/she either returns once the
visa expires or secures a new employment visa. Moreover, even if a
person has emigrated without the proper documents as required by the
receiving country and also by bypassing the legal channel of the sending
country, there is still a market for his/her services' to absorb him/her at
68 Many emigrants, especially women domestic workers, travel through the
system of ‘pushing’ under which one needs to bribe the officials in the
airport. Usually the agents take the emigrant to the airport and wait for the
‘right’ time and for the  ‘right’ kind of officials to be present. The official
either takes a break from the seat or just allows the emigrant to proceed
without proper documents, especially the POE clearance. The official gets
an envelope in return, which contains the amount of bribe. Though such
practices of border crossing are considered illegal in India, these emigrants
are considered no longer illegal once they reach the country of destination
(Bindhulakshmi, 2008; 2010).
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the destination.69 Too many or cumbersome regulations are also pushing
the aspiring emigrants to the illegal channel – regulations, which do not
provide any incentives in particular for those who follow the regulations.
In the current scenario, following the legal channel of emigration does
not offer much when it comes to the protection and welfare of emigrants
in the receiving countries.
The best illustration in this regard would be the emigration of
unskilled women workers from the country. The RA survey indicates
that, in general, they are reluctant to recruit women; or at least unwilling
to admit it even if they do recruit them.  Most of the RAs pointed out
that the recruitment of female workers, especially unskilled and semi-
skilled workers, is a risky business and could be undertaken only by
placing their reputation at stake. Unskilled and semi-skilled women
emigrants are looked down by many in the destination countries as
persons willingly or unwillingly agreeable to traffic themselves in
licentious ways. The government of India’s discriminatory regulations
against recruitment of lower categories of women workers, including
the minimum age norm, vindicates this public perception, disallowing
reputed RAs from venturing into it.  The government regulations nearly
proscribe emigration of unskilled and semi-skilled category women
workers through the formal channel - forcing them to choose the illegal
conduit. RAs in general admitted that the emigration of such categories
of women workers, especially housemaids, is possible only through the
channel of ‘pushing’. Noticeably, it is smaller agents who are more into
the undertaking of recruitment of women. While 91.7 per cent of the
RAs reported that they never recruited housemaids for overseas
employment, 15.4 per cent of the ‘up to 300’ category had agreed to
have sent women abroad as domestic workers. Burdensome regulations,
lack of protection for those who opt to emigrate along the legal channel,
69 The employers find the illegal migrant workers not only more obedient but
also more profitable due to their vulnerability to accept lower remuneration
on account of their illegal status.
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reluctance of credible RAs to recruit them and social stigma often force
the unskilled women emigrants to find alternatives to the legal conduit.70
One such notorious parallel structure is ‘Kasargod Embassy’ in northern
Kerala. It not only forges the required documents for emigration including
passports, but also facilitates emigration with their own modus operandi
and grievance redressal mechanism. It is not surprising that a good
number of unskilled workers, particularly women domestic workers from
Kerala, are finding this parallel network more responsive and supportive
to their requirements than the legal channel managed by the government
(Bindhulakshmi, 2008; 2010).  There are also reports that a significant
number of Asian housemaids are arriving on visit visas to the Gulf
countries. All these clandestine activities stand in their way of getting
reasonable wages and decent treatment in the countries to which they
emigrate.71
5. POE Offices: Grand Expectations and Structural Limits to
Protection
The responsibility to protect the interests of emigrants rests on
the ‘Protectors of Emigrants’ stationed in eight cities across the country.
Section 4 of the Emigration Act defines the responsibilities of the office
comprehensively.72 However, in practice, the powers of POEs have been
reduced to a mere exercise of giving emigration clearance and to an
uneventful supervision of RAs under their respective jurisdictions. The
survey of eight POEs conducted as part of the present study with the
help of a structured questionnaire clearly brings forth the structural
limits of the protective/regulative regime as represented by the PGE and
POEs. The ‘emigration clearance’ exercise, inherited from a colonial
notion that documentary uprightness and certification would protect
7 0 For a detailed description of the series of disabling governmental
interventions on unskilled women migration, see: Varghese, 2008.
71 There are frequent media reports in the Gulf regarding the ‘backdoor
recruitment’ of housemaids. See as an illustration: “Recruitment ruse rages,”
3 March 2008, Bahrain Tribune.
72 Section 4 (a-e), Emigration Act of 1983.
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the emigrant at the destination, is basically a document verification
exercise conducted under the rules and directions of the Government of
India from time to time. But even in the case of prescribed emigration
documents or the insistence for various documents by individual POE
offices, there is gross disarray. It is found that documents required and
insisted upon are not uniform across the eight POE offices,73 indicating
the fluidity within the system and the amount of discretionary powers
enjoyed by the POEs. The discretionary power is exercised more in the
cases of intending emigrants who seek emigration clearance through
registered RAs. This is the domain where collusion between POE offices
and RAs is evident; and the variations in the documentary requirements
insisted on by different POEs point to the degree of manipulability
involved.74  Moreover, the POEs do not follow any scientific procedure
to verify the veracity of the documents produced. One of the POEs
expressed the complexity of the issue vividly in his statement: “[I]t is
done through commonsense and experience. We lack a proper mechanism
for verification of authenticity.” Many POEs agree, saying, “[T]here
exists no sound or foolproof method for verifying the genuineness of
the documents”. They aver that it is not a feasible option to send all the
dubious documents submitted by the applicants or their RAs to the
concerned Indian embassies in order to ascertain their genuineness.
Ultimately “commonsense and experience” decide the outcome of the
game at the end of the day.
All, except one of the POEs, are of the view that the prevailing
system of emigration clearance is not at all foolproof and that fake
73 See the survey results in this regard in Irudaya Rajan, Varghese and Jayakumar
(2009).
74 While some of the POEs insist on Demand Letter and Power of Attorney
duly attested by the respective Indian Missions, others are not so insistent.
Some of them demand original visa, while a few others did not specify
whether they require the original visa or a copy of it.  Some others are
satisfied with copies of visas attested by the RAs concerned! Some demand
an indemnity bond from the RAs, while others are silent about it. And their
stand on whether the original or specimen work contract should be submitted
remains vague. (Ibid).
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documents, fraudulent practices and corruption reign supreme. However,
only half the POEs agree that the general perception that the overseas
recruitment system in India is rampant with corruption and cheating is,
by and large, valid. But even those who do not share this view agree that
there exist enough loopholes in the system that helps to perpetuate
corruption. The POEs who agree with this general perception underscore
forgery of documents as one of the main conduits of fraudulence. As one
of them stated, since “only copies of visas are furnished, there is [enough]
scope for fabrication” of false copies. The weak point of paper visas has
been highlighted by another POE: “[E]migration clearance is given on
the basis of paper visas. Genuineness of paper visas cannot be ascertained
from the copies of the visas.” It is acknowledged that “corruption in the
system starts from the very first stage, i.e., procurement of a certificate of
demand for manpower from foreign employers” and that not only visas,
but orders for recruitment are also purchased. Since each emigration, in
this way, involves diverse players and huge amounts of money, the
pressure to get things done ‘at any cost’ is stupendous. One of the POEs
believes that the collusive relationship between POEs and RAs is mainly
caused by the vulnerability of POEs! The POE often falls prey to the
machinations and pressures of RAs and the general public, who want to
get their business done promptly and without hassles at any cost! This
POE admitted that there were occasions when the RAs and the general
public tried to bribe the POE. His statement, however, did not give a clue
about how often POEs succumbed to pressures/enticements or how long
the irresistible would be resisted. Nevertheless, all the POEs, except one,
have not reported any knowledge about serious complaint of cheating
and fraudulent practice against RAs falling under their jurisdiction!
A huge amount and large variety of work is supposed to be
performed by the POE offices. However, it is apparent that they are
confronted with structural and physical inadequacies of various kinds.75
75 The POE offices in all eight locations were ill equipped both in terms of
manpower and physical infrastructure when the field survey was conducted
for this study.
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The number of emigration clearances given annually by the POE offices
is growing at an enormous scale – it almost doubled between 2003 and
2008, within a span of five years. But the infrastructure of POEs remained
almost the same; and many posts of office staff there lay vacant. The
POE office at Chandigarh which issues clearance to about 200 persons
per day functions with just two staff; one of them being the POE himself
(See Table 20 for the average number of emigration clearances granted
in each POE offices on a normal day of functioning). All applications
received on a day have to be processed and clearances have to be given
on the same day. This would “result in non-effective checking of records.”
The POE office in Mumbai is doing the highest number of emigration
clearances per day and it has 28 staff including three POEs. Chennai,
with the second highest number of clearances, has 10 staff including
two POEs. Delhi is the only other POE office with more than one POE (it
is equipped with two); the rest are single-POE run offices. Needless to
say  it is extremely difficult for a POE to carefully scrutinise all the
applications he receives and affix his signature.
Table 20: Average Number of Emigration Clearances per day by
POEs, 2007
POE Office Individual Through Project-
 RAs exporter Total
Chandigarh 02 200 05 207
Chennai 05 600 00 605
Delhi 10 320 05 335
Ernakulam 20 180 00 200
Hyderabad 15 135 00 150
Kolkata 03 40 00 43
Mumbai 80 1600 00 1680
Thiruvananthapuram 10 200 00 210
TOTAL 145 3275 10 3430
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Though the POE is supposed to make field visits to, and surprise
checks at, the RA offices, such visits hardly happen due to the pressure
of work. The difficulty is particularly apparent in the case of offices with
only one POE at the helm of affairs; the POE is duty bound to remain in
office on all normal working days, for signing of emigration clearance
certificates. Added to that is the fact that the POEs are not provided with
an office vehicle to make field inspections, particularly at RA offices
and airports. Although POEs are supposed to regulate the emigration
process in the country, the emigration officers and the Port Registration
Officers (PRO) at the airports do not come under the purview of the POE.
They do not even fall under the purview of the same Ministry. The
situation is such that for making an inspection at the emigration section
in the airports, the POEs have to obtain entry passes from the concerned
airport officials, something that would potentially defeat the very
purpose of inspection. Some POEs point out lack of proper security to
the POE offices as another major area of concern.
One of the POEs feels that the arsenal of ‘‘powers conferred on
POE does not match his/her responsibilities,” subtly indicating the
reason why POEs enter into collusive relationships with RAs.  Another
POE says that he is greatly handicapped in the effective discharge of
his duties as he is not equipped with any market intelligence and no
formal structures exist to get feedback on “what is happening on the
ground in the matter of illegal emigration services.”  Most often, illegal
recruitment activities take place in remote interior towns and villages
in which numerous free-floating, unauthorised agents allure people
with false promises. There are no formal mechanisms to aid POEs in
getting them information on such activities in distant locations. The
geographical jurisdiction of each POE is too vast for the office to
cover effectively. Lofty expectations in the context of such serious
inadequacies are unrealistic; they are seldom achieved, pointing to
the institutional failure.
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Still, a majority of the POEs see the existence and continuance of
POE offices as necessary and useful as there is no other administrative
mechanism in place to administer the Emigration Act of 1983. However,
some of them suggested that the role of the office of POE should be
redefined according to the requirements of changing times to equip it to
deal with emerging challenges. Most of them admitted that the objective
of protecting the interests of emigrants is hardly fulfilled at present;
instead, the system only sees to it that emigrants travel with all ‘necessary
documents’ and under safe terms and conditions of employment.
However, they admit that whether such “terms and conditions are actually
fulfilled by foreign employers is not being monitored.” It is also
underlined by them that the protection of emigrants would not fully be
possible without having the necessary mechanism in place to monitor
them and their employers in the destination countries as well.
The collusion between the RAs and the POE offices is a topic of
current discussion. It has become almost a commonplace impression
that the two collude to exploit emigrants, particularly of the lower
categories. A significant proportion of RAs accept informally that
corruption is a reality. They even aver that POE offices would cease to
function if bribes were not given. A majority of them stated that though
they themselves had not made any illegitimate payments to the POE
offices for getting clearances done, almost all the other RAs did so!
However, at least 20 per cent of them admitted that they paid bribes to
the officials of the POE for getting their routine work completed. The
smaller RAs were ahead of other categories in this regard; 25 per cent of
the ‘up to 300’ category RAs admitted that they bribed the POE office to
get their routine work done. As much as 36.5 per cent of the RAs in
South India had admittedly bribed POE offices, but the proportion is
just 11.1 per cent in the case of RAs from regions other than South
India.76 The payment made for each case would vary over a range of
76 See for details Irudaya Rajan, Varghese and Jayakumar (2010).
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Rs. 300 to 1,500 depending upon the degree of ‘risk’ involved. Some
RAs informally, admitted that the payment could go even up to Rs.
5,000 per case according to its specificity.
It is not surprising that the majority of the RAs surveyed (69.1 per
cent) felt that the office of the POE is necessary and should be continued.
It is also interesting to note that an almost equal proportion from among
the smallest (73.2 per cent) and the largest (70.3 per cent) size categories
held this view. But about one third of the RAs in the sample did see the
POE office essentially as an unnecessary addendum, not serving any
useful purpose at all. Most of the RAs were honest enough to admit that
the office of the POE is “necessary to protect our rights.” On the other
hand, some RAs viewed the POE as a necessary evil to ward off greater
evils. However, almost all of the RAs shared the view that a more credible
and efficient mechanism is the need of the hour.
The mechanisms of enforcement and grievance redressal of the
current institution of emigration governance continues to be very weak.
In the existing setup a criminal case on a cheating incident involving an
RA has to be registered at the local police station where the incident has
taken place. However there is apprehension that the local police are
usually susceptible to influences by the powerful. In such a situation,
cases initiated at the level of local police could hardly help the victim,
as RAs would be powerful enough to influence the local police machinery.
The victim might be made to go through many hardships that often s/he
either would not lodge a complaint at all or would give it up midway.
This calls for an institutional modification by which the complaints of
cheating and fraudulence should be permitted to be lodged at a higher
level, at least at the level of Circle Inspector or at a special cell dealing
with such cases in the District Superintendent of Police office.77
77 The Ministry can also think about a web portal where the concerned can
register their complaints. This portal may be used for multiple purposes
including dissemination of knowledge.
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78 An initiative as run successfully in Kochi deserves mention here. The City
Police Commissioner office has opened a separate cell to deal with overseas
recruitment and emigration related issues and the cell works in greater co-
ordination with the POE office and the registered recruiting agents. This
mechanism could be further strengthened by incorporating the civil society,
migrant associations and community organisations.
79 Quoted in Bahrain Tribune, 9 July 2008.
Moreover, there is no automatic surveillance mechanism over illegal
recruitment activities; that the police would usually take action only on
receiving a complaint.78 The support of the state police is said to be
very weak in this regard, as the Minister of MOIA himself has pointed
out “[T]hough the Ministry has referred so many cases to the state
authorities to take action… there has been no single conviction so far.”79
6. Conclusion
The current institution of emigration governance is grossly
inadequate to address the manifold problems associated with India’s
overseas recruitment sector is the message which this exploratory study
wishes to convey. An emigrant recruited by RA or going abroad through
his/her social network is deemed to be protected once s/he gets an
emigration clearance stamp from the POE. This exercise of ensuring
uprightness through documentary evidence is undermined not only by
absence of mechanism to check the veracity of the documents but also
by the nexus between the corrupt RAs and the governmental officials.
Moreover, the belief that somebody who emigrates with proper
documents will be safe and protected during their expatriate life has not
been proved to be correct.  They are not supported by any effective
mechanism at the destination country. The social cost of the existing
institution is enormously high especially when it fails to save from
harm the unskilled and semi-skilled labourers in the important labour
receiving countries from India like those in the Middle East, where
labour rights are least respected. An effective institution governing
overseas recruitment should necessarily be comprehensive enough to
ensure a transparent process of recruitment, orderly emigration and
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trouble-free expatriate life. Absence of institutional structures to ensure
the welfare of the overseas Indian workers and to keep a good watch
over the overseas employers is a serious inadequacy of the present
institution. Moreover, the governance of emigration through a principle
of ‘protection by exception’ is proving to be fundamentally
discriminatory, making the fine line running between protection and
restriction very thin. Experience indicates that the ECR status, given to
those citizens who supposedly deserve more protection than others, has
become a disabling tag. ECR in effect has become equivalent to a
declaration about one’s status as low in education and hence vulnerable
to exploitation by others. There are outliers within the ECR category;
the best example being the unskilled women emigrants who are pushed
to illegality by the existing regulative regime and social stigma attached
to such emigrants.  The enormous economic and social pressures which
force them to seek work outside the country, involvement of multiple
players and a weak institutional structure of regulation have made
emigration for expatriate work a highly expensive and risky affair too. If
the RA channel makes the emigrants particularly vulnerable to
exploitation on multiple fronts, emigration through social network too
is not free from the involvement of unscrupulous players. The parallel
economy of illegal e(im)migration is quite active both in India and in
the destination countries with deep rooted structures in place operating
in a transnational space. The credibility of the overseas recruitment
system in India as a whole is at stake. The institutional failure which is
the cause of this cannot be rectified by cosmetic changes but calls for a
comprehensive reform.
Hence we recommend the creation of a new institution of
emigration governance in place of the existing one with a dual focus.
Firstly, the discriminatory regulatory regime in overseas recruitment
and management should be scrapped and replaced by another which
makes it liberal and which recognises the fundamental principle of equal
opportunity. The discrimination among citizens in the name of protection
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has essentially resulted in a situation wherein the neediest sections are
prevented from/denied an opportunity for mobility through emigration.
Proscribing mobility through disabling measures cannot be a strategy
for protection under any liberal regime with a welfarist orientation (this
pertains to low-skilled emigrants in general and low-skilled women
emigrants in particular). Secondly, an effective management system of
emigration which is comprehensive enough to cover all aspects of
emigration and expatriate life should be put in place to promote upright
recruitment and orderly emigration. An Indian Migration Management
Authority (IMMA) is recommended to be established for the purpose,
which should administer all aspects of migration through flawless
coordination among different ministries, state and federal authorities.
All categories of Indian labourers who would like to proceed for overseas
employment should be able to do so with full information about the
pros and cons of the same, and professionally and technically equipped
to get a fair deal in the receiving countries. The responsibility of the
home-wing of IMMA should not be limited merely to an exercise of
document verification. It should act in coordination with the overseas
wing of IMMA located in different destination countries. It should also
issue to the emigrants who leave the country for employment with Indian
Citizen Employed Overseas (ICEO) Card enabled with a micro-chip
containing all essential information about the holder, and which also
should bear testimony to the legality of the status of its holder. This
would also ensure establishment of an automated baseline data generation
on emigration for the country. IMMA should be empowered to deal with
the RAs effectively and impartially and a wing of the proposed Authority
should exclusively focus on recruiting agents. Corporatisation of the
sector must be seriously considered; and a specific wing of IMMA may
be designed to act as the regulator with a strong monitoring and
enforcement mechanism. Simultaneously, licensing rules for RAs must
be made stringent and violations should be dealt with by imposing
penalties of exemplary nature. It is also important to promote good
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practices in the overseas recruitment field with the help of proper
incentive mechanisms. The RAs should be allowed to collect reasonable
service charges from the recruitees, till the Government of India through
bilateral agreements, makes the foreign employers bear the recruitment
charges completely. Illegal recruitment and illegal emigration could be
effectively prevented by disincentivising it and granting incentives for
emigration through the legal conduit. Apart from ensuring a hassle-free
emigration experience and ensuring workers’ welfare at the destinations,
the legal channel should also offer comprehensive social protection to
the workers. A separate wing of IMMA’s home establishment should
manage the social protection of emigrants and return migrants with
professional competence in such a way that this should make
circumvention of the legal channel an unattractive/unaffordable option
to the emigrants. Another wing of IMMA should focus on equipping
Indian labourers with necessary skills and quality levels for foreign
employment by devising finishing courses in potential fields/subjects
and pre-departure training. IMMA should be equipped to help the
potential emigrants to make informed decisions through dissemination
of reliable information. The overseas offices of IMMA, on the other
hand, should protect Indian expatriate workers in the respective
destination countries and systematically ensure fair recruitment of
workers from India. All emigration-related documents from the
destination countries should be channelised through this office, until
the Government of India, through bilateral and multilateral agreements,
makes all the documents from the receiving countries available online
for ready verification by anybody. The intention of this measure should
not be nationalisation of labour by putting more layers and processes in
place; instead it should be systemically and practically promotive in
nature. Once migration and expatriate work is made a safe and reliable
mobility option, it will attract more participation, beating a possible
temporary slow down in the transition phase. The time and resources
spent on the establishment of IMMA can be reduced to a minimum if the
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Government of India eventually succeeds in getting the essential
documents of emigration published online through an e-networking
with major receiving countries. Such a comprehensive institutional
change through considered interventions by the state at multiple levels
only can effectively counter the many and varied illegitimate and
dishonest activities which have sprung up in the field of emigration and
ensure ethical practices in India’s overseas recruitment sector.
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